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The Law of Gender Stereotyping and the
Work-Family Conflicts of Men
Stephanie Bornstein
This Article looks back to the early equal protection jurisprudence of the 1970s and
Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s litigation strategy of using men as plaintiffs in sex
discrimination cases to cast a renewed focus on antidiscrimination law as a means to
redress the work-family conflicts of men. From the beginning of her litigation strategy as
the head of the ACLU Women’s Rights Project, Ginsburg defined sex discrimination as
the detrimental effects of gender stereotypes that constrained both men and women
from living their lives as they wished—not solely the minority status of women. The
same sex-based stereotypes that kept women out of the market sphere kept men out of
the domestic sphere, and both were unlawful. Through a handful of key cases,
Ginsburg challenged sex-based stereotypes that cast men as breadwinner and women as
caregiver, succeeding in convincing the Supreme Court to establish a standard of
heightened scrutiny for sex-based classifications.
In the four decades since, women have made great strides in entering and advancing in
the market sphere. Meanwhile, men’s advancement in the domestic sphere, while
initially on the rise after the mid-1960s, has stalled since the late 1980s. Today, men
have begun to prevail in lawsuits against their employers when they are penalized at
work for participating in caregiving responsibilities at home. For the most part,
however, their legal claims are not sex discrimination, but claims that courts can more
easily recognize as actionable for men—such as violations of family and medical leave
or benefits laws. Despite their lack of sex discrimination claims, however, such cases
reveal the persistence of entrenched gender stereotypes about men’s and women’s
proper roles when it comes to family caregiving. At the same time, Title VII case law
now recognizes that penalties for gender nonconformity and stereotyping of mothers
may be actionable sex discrimination. By combining these areas of jurisprudence, this
Article argues that courts are failing to recognize actionable sex discrimination against
men in the work-family context: Even without being covered by family and medical
leave or benefits laws, men may prevail in lawsuits to redress penalties at work based
on caregiving at home by alleging sex discrimination under a gender stereotyping
theory. Following the reasoning first adopted by the Supreme Court in the equal
protection cases litigated by Ginsburg in the 1970s, penalizing men at work for acting
as caregivers instead of unencumbered breadwinners is sex discrimination under Title
VII.

 Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. I
wish to thank Allison Tait (Yale Law School Class of 2011) and Jennie Stephens-Romero (Hastings
Class of 2012) for their invaluable research assistance; Cynthia Thomas Calvert for her expertise in
developing the Center for WorkLife Law’s database of caregiver discrimination cases, which provided
a key research foundation; and Joan C. Williams for her essential feedback and support.
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Introduction
Forty years ago, shortly after Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 made discrimination on the basis of sex illegal in the workplace,
Ruth Bader Ginsburg created a legal strategy to root out the same type
of discrimination in other areas of life using the constitutional doctrine of
1
equal protection. As the architect of the ACLU Women’s Rights Project
litigation strategy, Ginsburg framed the problem the law needed to
resolve not as the minority status of women, but as the unlawful sexbased stereotyping of both men and women under traditional notions of
“separate spheres” that constrained individuals from living their lives as
2
they wished. Through a series of cases in the 1970s, Ginsburg succeeded
in establishing a heightened level of scrutiny for sex-based classifications
3
in state and federal laws. As she conceptualized it, writing sex-based
stereotypes into the laws of the land was sex discrimination in violation
4
of equal protection —and the Supreme Court agreed.
In the decades since, explicit sex-based distinctions in the law and
the workplace have all but vanished, yet the stereotypes at their root
5
remain, particularly at the intersection of work and family. As
discrimination has become increasingly more subtle and our
understanding of bias and stereotyping has evolved, the law has
developed continually to redress modern-day discrimination. Consistent
with Ginsburg’s early construction of sex discrimination as based on
stereotypes, jurisprudence under Title VII now recognizes a gender
stereotyping theory, under which workplace penalties and harassment of
individuals for failing to conform to gender stereotypes may be
6
actionable sex discrimination. A parallel line of case law under the
1. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Gender and the Constitution, 44 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1, 8–9, 37–38
(1975) (discussing Title VII and constitutional law together); David Von Drehle, Redefining Fair with
a Simple Careful Assault, Wash. Post, July 19, 1993, at A1 (discussing strategy); Tribute: The Legacy
of Ruth Bader Ginsburg and WRP Staff, ACLU (Mar. 7, 2006), http://www.aclu.org/womensrights/tribute-legacy-ruth-bader-ginsburg-and-wrp-staff (discussing strategy). See generally Amy Leigh
Campbell, Raising the Bar: Ruth Bader Ginsburg and the ACLU Women’s Rights Project, 11 Tex. J.
Women & L. 157 (2002).
2. See Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 28–29, 34–42 (“[I]ndeed above all else, the home-work gap
must be confronted . . . . The breadwinning male/homemaking female division of functions deserves
neither special favor nor condemnation by the law. It is a pattern individuals should be free to adopt
or reject, without government coercion.”); Michael J. Klarman, Social Reform Litigation and Its
Challenges: An Essay in Honor of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 32 Harv. J.L. & Gender 251, 271–75
(2009) (“The most insidious of . . . [gender] stereotypes, Ginsburg believed, was that of male
breadwinner and female homemaker.”).
3. See Von Drehle, supra note 1; ACLU, supra note 1.
4. See Cary Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law,
85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 83, 87–88, 91–92, 104–06, 120–25 (2010); Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 28–29, 34–42;
Klarman, supra note 2, at 271–75.
5. See infra Part III.
6. See infra Part II.
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Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (“FMLA”) has also recognized
that the FMLA was intended to further redress sex discrimination and
has identified that the intersection of work and family is where gender
7
stereotyping remains the most entrenched. Most recently, developing
law in the area of caregiver discrimination, along with the 2007
enforcement guidance issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”), has applied Title VII gender stereotyping
8
theory directly to the work-family context.
While most courts now follow these lines of jurisprudence and
recognize detrimental stereotyping of working mothers as sex
discrimination, courts fail to recognize the same theory when it penalizes
men. The vast majority of cases brought by male plaintiffs in the workfamily context are brought under family and medical leave laws—
9
protections that fail to cover a significant portion of the workforce. In
failing to recognize that the same gender stereotypes that police women
out of breadwinning roles also police men out of caregiving roles, courts
are missing a wide swath of impermissible sex discrimination. This
Article argues that, as the law now stands, men may prevail in Title VII
sex discrimination lawsuits when penalized for caregiving at work, even
in the absence of leave or benefits laws. Connecting these related
jurisprudential dots completes the vision for redressing the problem of
sex discrimination that Ginsburg first articulated forty years ago: rooting
out the detrimental gender stereotypes of separate spheres that constrain
10
both women and men at work and at home.
7. See infra Part III.
8. See infra Part IV.
9. For example, because of its length of service and size of employer requirements, the FMLA
fails to cover a full 40% of the U.S. workforce (two in every five American workers), and lowerincome workers are more likely to lack coverage. Katherin Ross Phillips, The Urban Inst., Getting
Time Off: Access to Leave Among Working Parents 1–2 (2004). As of the most recent U.S.
Department of Labor survey data available, only 58.3% of all employees worked in FMLA-covered
establishments, and only 46.9% of employees in the private sector were both covered by the FMLA
and eligible to take FMLA leave. Jane Waldfogel, Family and Medical Leave: Evidence from the 2000
Surveys, Monthly Lab. Rev., Sept. 2001, at 17, 19–20.
10. A great deal of scholarship has been written about Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s equal protection
jurisprudence in the area of sex discrimination. For examples of this scholarship, see Julie A.
Greenberg, The Gender Nonconformity Theory: A Comprehensive Approach to Break Down the
Maternal Wall and End Discrimination Against Gender Benders, 26 T. Jefferson L. Rev. 37 (2003);
Rebecca L. Barnhart & Deborah Zalesne, Twin Pillars of Judicial Philosophy: The Impact of the
Ginsburg Collegiality and Gender Discrimination Principles on Her Separate Opinions Involving
Gender Discrimination, 7 N.Y. City L. Rev. 275 (2004); Courtney Megan Cahill, Celebrating the
Differences That Could Make a Difference: United States v. Virginia and a New Vision of Sexual
Equality, 70 Ohio St. L.J. 943 (2009); Martha Chamallas, Ledbetter, Gender Equity and Institutional
Context, 70 Ohio St. L.J. 1037 (2009); Jennifer Yatskis Dukart, Geduldig Reborn: Hibbs as a
Success (?) of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s Sex-Discrimination Strategy, 93 Calif. L. Rev. 541 (2005);
Toni J. Ellington et al., Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Gender Discrimination, 20 Hawaii L. Rev.
699 (1998); Kenneth L. Karst, “The Way Women Are”: Some Notes in the Margin for Ruth Bader
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I. Ginsburg’s Vision: Separate Spheres Violates the Equal
Protection of BOTH Women AND Men
From the beginning of her tenure as the founding director of the
ACLU Women’s Rights Project, Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s goal was to
“open all doors for men and for women” and to “get rid of all overt
11
gender-based classifications” for men and women alike. Ginsburg
understood that the same stereotypes that limited women’s advancement
at work also limited men’s ability to participate actively in family life
(which cyclically reinforced limitations on women’s advancement by
12
perpetuating women’s near-total responsibility for home life). The
central goal of the cases Ginsburg pursued on behalf of the ACLU in the
1970s was to deconstruct the gender system, which led her to an unlikely
13
strategy for a women’s rights organization: representing male plaintiffs.
Yet given her vision of sex discrimination as a two-sided coin of
constraints imposed by sex-based stereotypes, she realized she could
14
achieve her goal just as well by using either male or female plaintiffs.
Personal accounts of Ginsburg’s own experiences underscore her
approach to sex discrimination as the unlawful operation of sex
stereotypes. As a full-time working mother with young children,
whenever the school her son attended needed to speak to a parent, they
15
would call her. After a series of such interruptions while working as a
Columbia law professor, Ginsburg decided to raise the school’s awareness:
“This child has two parents,” she told the school administrator the next
time she received such a call. “[P]lease alternate your calls; it’s his father’s
16
17
turn.” After that, she found that the calls tapered off dramatically.

Ginsburg, 20 Hawaii L. Rev. 619 (1998); Deborah Jones Merritt, Hearing the Voices of Individual
Women and Men: Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 20 Hawaii L. Rev. 635 (1998); Carey Olney, Better
Bitch than Mouse: Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Feminism, and VMI, 9 Buff. Women’s L.J. 97 (2000–2001);
Neil S. Siegel & Reva B. Siegel, Pregnancy and Sex Role Stereotyping: From Struck to Carhart,
70 Ohio St. L.J. 1095 (2009); Neil S. Siegel & Reva B. Siegel, Struck by Stereotype: Ruth Bader
Ginsburg on Pregnancy Discrimination as Sex Discrimination, 59 Duke L.J. 771 (2010). In addition,
many have written about the concept of gender stereotypes in the law. For recent examples, see
Franklin, supra note 4; Monica Diggs Mange, The Formal Equality Theory in Practice: The Inability of
Current Antidiscrimination Law to Protect Conventional and Unconventional Persons, 16 Columb. J.
Gender & L. 1 (2007); Meredith M. Render, Gender Rules, 22 Yale J.L. & Feminism 133 (2010); Kerri
Lynn Stone, Clarifying Stereotyping, 59 Kan. L. Rev. 591 (2011).
11. Interview by Joan C. Williams with Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Legally Speaking Series, Univ. of
Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law, in S.F., Cal. (Sept. 15, 2011).
12. See Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 28–29, 34–42 (“Solutions to the home-work problem are as
easily stated as they are hard to realize: man must join woman at the center of family life, and
government must step in to assist both of them during the years when they have small children.”);
Klarman, supra note 2, at 271–75.
13. See Interview by Williams, supra note 11; see also ACLU, supra note 1.
14. Interview by Williams, supra note 11.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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Another account, from many years later, tells of a photograph on
“prominent display” in Ginsburg’s judicial chambers, of “her son-in-law
18
gazing adoringly at his newborn child.” Of the picture she explained,
“This is my dream for society . . . . Fathers loving and caring for and
19
helping to raise their kids.”
As she conceived of and litigated it in the 1970s—and as the
Supreme Court agreed based on the outcome of the litigation—reliance
on stereotypical notions of separate spheres, that men should be
breadwinners and women caregivers, was sex discrimination against both
20
women and men. “If I were to invent an affirmative action plan [for
gender],” she recently explained, “it would be to give men every
21
incentive to be close to children.”
A. Men and Women as Caregivers: REED V. REED and MORITZ V. C.I.R.
22

23

In her first two briefs with the ACLU —Reed v. Reed and Moritz
24
v. C.I.R. —Ginsburg challenged laws related to the proper roles of men
and women as caregivers. With these two cases, Ginsburg established the
litigation strategy she would pursue on behalf of the ACLU Women’s
Rights Project throughout the next decade: to challenge state and federal
statutes that wrote gender stereotypes into the law and to establish a
25
heightened level of constitutional scrutiny for sex-based classifications.
Ginsburg viewed Reed and Moritz as companion cases, referring to them
26
as the “mother” and “grandmother” cases. Her goal was to get both
27
cases before the Supreme Court at the same time, to have the high court
rule on laws that relied on the stereotype that women, and not men,
should be caregivers, from the perspective of both male and female
28
plaintiffs. When the Moritz plaintiff prevailed in the Tenth Circuit,
however, the Supreme Court denied certiorari, leaving its ruling in Reed
29
to set the path for cases that followed.

17. Id.
18. Von Drehle, supra note 1.
19. Id.
20. See Franklin, supra note 4, at 87–88, 91–92, 104–06, 120–25; Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 28–29,
34–42; Klarman, supra note 2, at 271–75; see also Dukart, supra note 10, at 558–61.
21. Interview by Williams, supra note 11.
22. See Franklin, supra note 4, at 125; Deborah Jones Merritt & Wendy Webster Williams,
Transcript of Interview of U.S. Supreme Court Associate Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, April 10, 2009,
70 Ohio St. L.J. 805, 809, 810 (2009).
23. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
24. 469 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 906 (1973).
25. See Von Drehle, supra note 1; ACLU, supra note 1.
26. Interview by Williams, supra note 11; see Merritt & Williams, supra note 22, at 810–11.
27. Interview by Williams, supra note 11.
28. Id.
29. Moritz v. C.I.R., 412 U.S. 906 (1973) (denying petition for certiorari from 469 F.2d 466 (10th
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In Reed, representing a woman, Ginsburg challenged an Idaho state
probate law that distinguished between men and women in recognizing
who was a preferable estate administrator after a family member’s
30
death. Sally Reed and her husband Cecil separated, and later divorced,
31
when their son Richard was a young child. When Richard committed
suicide as a teenager, both parents sought to be the administrator of his
32
estate. Under a state law requiring that where the parties petitioning to
be estate administrators were equally entitled, males were preferred to
females, the Idaho probate court appointed Cecil Reed as the
33
administrator.
In her brief to the U.S. Supreme Court on behalf of Sally Reed,
Ginsburg first articulated her argument that sex-based classifications in
the law often rely on stereotypes and should be subjected to a higher
34
level of constitutional scrutiny than a mere rational basis test. Here, the
stereotype was that women, while suited to provide care as mothers,
could not be involved in the financial matters of those children for whom
35
they cared. Sally Reed had primary custody and raised Richard until he
36
was a teenager, when Cecil sought and was awarded partial custody.
Sally opposed this because she thought Cecil was a bad influence; indeed,
37
Richard committed suicide with a rifle owned by Cecil. Yet Sally’s
contribution as primary caregiver was limited to just that by state law, so
long as an equally suited man applied to be the estate administrator.
Ginsburg’s brief highlighted the role that sex-based stereotypes and
assumptions, particularly those about work and family, played in the
Idaho state law. “Whatever differences may exist between the sexes,” she
argued, “legislative judgments have frequently been based on inaccurate
38
stereotypes of the capacities and sensibilities of women.” Arguing for a
higher standard of scrutiny than rational basis when state laws relied on
sex-based classifications, she honed in on the separate spheres ideology,
arguing that “[t]he traditional division within the home—father decides,
39
mother nurtures—is reinforced by diverse provisions of state law.” Yet
“however much some men may wish to preserve Victorian notions about

Cir. 1972)).
30. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 72 (1971).
31. Id. at 71; Merritt & Williams, supra note 22, at 811.
32. Reed, 404 U.S. at 71–72; Merritt & Williams, supra note 22, at 811.
33. Reed, 404 U.S. at 72–73.
34. Brief for Appellant at 5–7, Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (No. 70-4); see Merritt & Williams, supra note
22, at 811–12.
35. Brief for Appellant, supra note 34, at 5–7.
36. Merritt & Williams, supra note 22, at 811.
37. Id.
38. Brief for Appellant, supra note 34, at 17.
39. Id. at 34.
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woman’s relation to man, and the ‘proper’ role of women in society,” she
reasoned, “the law cannot provide support for obsolete male prejudices
40
or translate them into statutes that enforce sex-based discrimination.”
Turning the separate spheres ideology on its head, Ginsburg
concluded her brief with an argument about the economic value of
caregiving: Because she ran the household, Sally Reed was likely better
suited than her ex-husband to manage the estate of her deceased child:
[I]t is not unlikely that more women than men have the kind of
“business experience” most relevant to the duties of an administrator.
Women who do not work outside the home often handle most if not all
the financial affairs of their family unit. Managerial responsibility,
including the settlement of accounts and the preservation of property,
is a central part of their daily occupation. As preparation for the duties
of an administrator, experience in household management surely is not
inferior to experience in such typically male occupations as truck
41
driver, construction worker, factory worker, or farm laborer.

As Ginsburg reasoned, stereotypes that limited women’s roles to
providing family care but not managing family affairs were not only
unfair but also illogical, because to run the domestic sphere required the
woman of the house to interact with the market. The Court found
Ginsburg’s arguments persuasive and struck down the Idaho statute as
an “arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause
42
of the Fourteenth Amendment.”
Around the same time, in Moritz v. C.I.R., representing a man,
Ginsburg challenged the other side of the stereotype that women should
be caregivers and men should not, by challenging a federal tax law that
43
allowed a caregiving deduction for women but not men. Charles Moritz
was a single, unmarried man who worked full-time as editor of the
44
western division of a Philadelphia publishing company. His eighty-nineyear-old mother, who was in a wheelchair due to arthritis and suffered
from diminished memory and hearing, lived with him and refused to go
45
to a nursing home. To meet the demands of his job, which required
extensive travel, he hired a woman to provide care for his mother in his
46
absence and paid her a salary and meals. At the time, federal tax law
allowed expenses “for the care of one or more dependents” to be
deducted “by a taxpayer who is a woman or widower [including women
and men who are divorced or legally separated], or is a husband whose

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 46.
Id. at 66.
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
469 F.2d 466, 467–68 (10th Cir. 1972).
Id. at 468.
Id.
Id.
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wife is incapacitated or is institutionalized . . . but only if such care is for
47
the purpose of enabling the taxpayer to be gainfully employed.” Thus
the threshold question the Tenth Circuit had to address was whether it
was Charles Moritz’s responsibility to provide care for his mother as it
48
would have been for any wife, ex-wife, or sister of his.
As Ginsburg described it, Moritz wanted a caretaker tax credit to
which he would have been entitled if he was a “dutiful daughter” instead
49
of a never-married “dutiful son.” Ironically, in its choice of how to
defend the statute, the government actually lent support to Moritz’s
argument by relying firmly on stereotypes of who could provide
caregiving for dependent family members, arguing that Moritz “did not
establish that [he] was qualified or able to furnish the type of care
required . . . [because] his supplying the care himself was not a realistic
50
alternative to his being employed.” Because he could not prove that he
would have been the one to care for his mother if he was not working,
51
the government argued, he was not entitled to the deduction.
In a brief to the Tenth Circuit that bore “a strong resemblance” to
52
the appellate brief to the Supreme Court that she filed in Reed,
Ginsburg argued that the law was based on a gender stereotype that was
untrue. “Congress never suggested, nor could any rational person
believe,” she reasoned, “that the biological differences between sons and
daughters are related to the activity in question here—provision of care
53
for an invalid parent.” Citing a dozen prior cases demonstrating that
courts were “[n]o longer shackled by decisions reflecting social . . .
54
conditions or . . . theories of an earlier era,” she argued that “[l]egislative
discrimination grounded on sex, for purposes unrelated to any biological
or functional difference between the sexes” required the same strict
55
scrutiny as discrimination based on race. And, while women were the
usual victims of sex-based stereotypes, “the constitutional sword
necessarily has two edges: Fair and equal treatment for women means
56
fair and equal treatment for members of both sexes.” Speaking later of
the case, she recalled that “in those days,” one “could make the
assumption that a daughter would be able to care for an elderly parent,

47. Id. (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 214(a) (1967)).
48. Id. at 467–68 (“[W]e need [to] discuss . . . whether . . . the expenses [Moritz] paid for care of
[his] mother . . . were for the purpose of enabling him to be gainfully employed . . . .”).
49. Interview by Williams, supra note 11; see Merritt & Williams, supra note 22, at 809.
50. Moritz, 469 F.2d at 469.
51. Id.
52. Merritt & Williams, supra note 22, at 811.
53. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 18, Moritz, 469 F.2d 466 (No. 71-1127).
54. Id. at 18.
55. Id. at 19.
56. Id. at 20.
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but . . . [not] a son”—that is, “a woman can take care of [a] . . . parent or
57
a child, but a man would have to prove he had that ability.” Noting that
the services performed by the caregiver Moritz hired “were in the nature
of general care and not specialized medical attention which Moritz could
not give,” the Tenth Circuit agreed, holding that “the denial of the
deduction to a man who has not married” could not pass constitutional
58
muster. Because the tax code classification was “premised primarily on
sex,” the Tenth Circuit applied the equal protection principles as
established in Reed v. Reed to hold that the statute impermissibly “made
a special discrimination premised on sex alone”—the stereotype that a
59
single man is unqualified to care for an elderly parent.
B. Men and Women as Breadwinners: FRONTIERO V. RICHARDSON and
CALIFANO V. GOLDFARB
Following her victories in Reed and Moritz, Ginsburg challenged the
other side of the problematic coin of separate spheres by tackling laws
related to the proper roles of men and women as breadwinners. In two
60
61
subsequent cases, Frontiero v. Richardson and Califano v. Goldfarb,
Ginsburg challenged stereotypes that men, and not women, could be
breadwinners for their families by arguing that benefits requiring
husbands, but not wives, to prove financial dependency on their spouses
also violated equal protection.
Representing a woman in Frontiero, Ginsburg and the ACLU as
amicus curiae helped to challenge a federal statute that allowed an
increased housing allowance and medical benefits for military wives
regardless of their dependency on their husbands, but for military
62
husbands only if they proved financial dependency on their wives. Air
Force Lieutenant Sharron Frontiero applied for an increase in her
housing allowance and medical and dental benefits for her husband
63
Joseph, a veteran and full-time college student. Under the federal
statute providing such benefits (designed “to attract career personnel
through re-enlistment”), a male servicemember’s wife was automatically
considered a dependent, while a female servicemember was required to

57. Merritt & Williams, supra note 22, at 810.
58. Moritz, 469 F.2d at 469. By late 1971, after the tax year in question but before the Tenth
Circuit decision was rendered, the statute was amended to provide the deduction for any “individual
who maintains a household which includes as a member one or more qualifying [dependents].” Id. at
468 n.2.
59. Id. at 470.
60. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
61. 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
62. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 679–81.
63. Id.
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demonstrate that her husband relied on her income for over half of his
64
financial support.
Again, the approach was to challenge gender stereotypes written
into the law as sex discrimination in violation of equal protection. The
65
brief written by plaintiffs’ counsel argued that, while the statute might
have been “an attempt to guess [the] actual dependency” of husbands
and wives, “the true basis for this discriminatory legislation can be traced
to a sex stereotype which predominated in the heyday of the common
66
law”—the stereotype of “woman as the dependent homebound wife.”
In her amicus brief on behalf of the ACLU, Ginsburg further tied the
violation to impermissible stereotyping, arguing that the statute “rests
upon a foundation of . . . custom which assumes that the male is the
dominant partner . . . and which reinforces restrictive and outdated sex
role stereotypes about married women and their participation in the
67
workforce.” Highlighting statistics from the time period that “relegate
to myth the notions that relatively few married women work, and that
when they do, their earnings are ‘pin money’ rather than an essential part
of the family’s finances,” Ginsburg reasoned that the statue “reinforce[d]
restrictive and outdated sex-role stereotypes and penalize[d] married
68
women who do not conform to the assumed general pattern.” For
women like Sharron Frontiero, “[i]n marriage, the wife is presently th[e]
69
primary wage-earner; the husband, the ‘assistant breadwinner.’”
Again, the Supreme Court agreed with Ginsburg and the plaintiffs,
striking down the federal law as a violation of equal protection. Writing
for the plurality, Justice Brennan highlighted the nation’s “long and
unfortunate history of sex discrimination. . . . rationalized by an attitude
of ‘romantic paternalism’ which, in practical effect, put women, not on a
70
pedestal, but in a cage.” In particular, Justice Brennan criticized the
Court’s 1873 decision in Bradwell v. Illinois, which enshrined separate
spheres ideology by “proclaim[ing that] . . . . ‘[t]he constitution of the
family organization . . . founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the
nature of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly
belongs to the domain and functions of womanhood’” and “repugnant to
the idea of a woman adopting a distinct and independent career from

64. Id. at 679–80.
65. Note that Ginsburg did not author this brief but argued the case as amicus curiae. See
Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 678 (listing Joseph J. Levin Jr. and Morris S. Dees Jr. as arguing the cause and
authoring the brief for appellants, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Melvin L. Wulf as arguing the cause
and authoring the brief for amicus curiae ACLU).
66. Brief for Appellants at 59, Frontiero, 411 U.S. 677 (No. 71-1694).
67. Brief for Amicus Curiae ACLU at 7, Frontiero, 411 U.S. 677 (No. 71-1694).
68. Id. at 24–25.
69. Id. at 27.
70. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 684.
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that of her husband.” Based on these deeply rooted ideas, Justice
Brennan explained, “our statute books gradually became laden with
gross, stereotyped distinctions between the sexes,” such as the law
72
Sharron Frontiero challenged. Relying on the precedent established in
Reed, the Court held that the law holding servicewomen to a different
standard than servicemen to obtain benefits for their families was
73
unconstitutional sex discrimination.
Shortly thereafter, representing a man in Califano v. Goldfarb,
Ginsburg mounted a similar challenge to a federal law that provided
social security survivor benefits for widows regardless of their
dependency on their husbands, but for widowers only after proving their
74
prior financial dependency on their wives. Prior to her death, Hannah
Goldfarb had worked as a secretary for New York City public schools for
nearly twenty-five years, during which time she paid all required social
75
security taxes. When her surviving husband Leon, who was retired,
applied for widower’s benefits, his application was denied because he
could not prove that he had been receiving over half of his financial
76
support from his wife at the time of her death. Under the relevant
federal law, surviving widows were not similarly required to prove
77
dependency on their deceased husbands to receive such benefits.
As in Frontiero, Ginsburg’s brief argued that relying on gender
stereotypes that devalued women’s roles as breadwinners was sex
78
discrimination in violation of equal protection. The social security
statute at issue, she argued, “assumes gainful employment as a domain in
which men come first, women second,” which in effect “promote[s] the
traditional division of labor between men and women” and “retard[s]
society’s progress toward equal opportunity, free from gender-based
79
discrimination.” Like the laws held unconstitutional in Reed and
Frontiero, she reasoned, “statutes that make convenient assumptions
80
about ‘the way women (or men) are’” violate the Constitution. Quoting
Congresswoman Martha Griffiths, Ginsburg’s brief highlighted the
impermissible influence of separate spheres ideology: “The income
security programs of this nation were designed for a land of male and

71. Id. at 684–85 (citing Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J.,
concurring)).
72. Id. at 685.
73. Id. at 690–91.
74. 430 U.S. 199, 201–02 (1977).
75. Id. at 202–03.
76. Id. at 203.
77. Id. at 201.
78. Brief for Appellee, Califano, 430 U.S. 199 (No. 75-699), 1976 WL 181387, at *17.
79. Id. at *24.
80. Id.
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female stereotypes, a land where all men were breadwinners and all
women were wives or widows; where men provided necessary income for
their families but women did not”—a “view of the world [that] never
81
matched reality, but today . . . is further than ever from the truth.”
Once again, based in part on the precedent established in Frontiero,
82
the Court agreed. Noting that the distinction in the federal
requirements “deprive[s] women of protection for their families which
men receive as a result of their employment” (that is, deprives Hannah
Goldfarb’s husband of the social security taxes she had paid out of her
salary for twenty-five years), the Court held that “the gender-based
83
84
differentiation” was unconstitutional. The statute was, according to the
Court, “supported by no more substantial justification than ‘archaic and
overbroad’ generalizations . . . that are more consistent with ‘the role85
typing society has long imposed,’ than with contemporary reality.” In
striking down the law, the Court held that “such assumptions do not
suffice to justify a gender-based discrimination in the distribution of
86
employment-related benefits.”
C. Mothers and Fathers: WEINBERGER V. WIESENFELD
The culmination of Ginsburg’s strategy to challenge assumptions
that men were not proper caregivers and women were not proper
87
breadwinners came in the case of Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, in which
Ginsburg challenged both sides of separate spheres stereotypes at once.
In Wiesenfeld, representing a father whose wife had died in childbirth,
Ginsburg challenged a federal law that provided social security survivor
benefits to children and the widows or surviving divorcées who cared for
88
them (“mother’s insurance benefits”), but not to widowers. When Paula
Wiesenfeld, a public school teacher and her family’s primary breadwinner,
died of an embolism after giving birth to a healthy son, her husband

81. Id. at *28 (quoting Congresswoman Martha Griffiths) (internal quotations omitted).
82. Califano, 430 U.S. at 217.
83. Id. at 206.
84. Id. at 207.
85. Id. at 206–07 (citations omitted); cf. Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 352–56 (1974) (holding that
a state statute giving widows a $500 property tax exemption did not violate equal protection where it
benefitted a certain class based on a reasonable distinction in state policy that did not conflict with the
Constitution). The Kahn case was the only one out of the six cases that Ginsburg argued before the
Supreme Court in which she did not prevail. See Von Drehle, supra note 1. Note, however, that
Ginsburg did not choose to bring this case; it was filed by a local ACLU affiliate without her
knowledge, and she was brought in for the appeal to the Supreme Court. Id. Because she was
concerned about the strength of the plaintiff’s case, she argued the case under a rational basis test for
fear of setting back the effort toward heightened scrutiny for sex-based classifications. Id.
86. Califano, 430 U.S. at 217.
87. 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
88. Id. at 640–41.
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Stephen applied for and was denied survivor benefits for himself.
Stephen was determined to care for his son and not return to work full90
time until his son was in school full-time. Had he been a woman, he
would have been entitled to survivor benefits for himself “as long as he
was not working,” or, if he was working, offset by an amount based on
91
what he earned. Because he was a man, however, the benefits were not
available to him.
In her lawsuit on his behalf, Ginsburg argued that sex-based
classifications in employment benefits laws were impermissible when
92
women’s contributions as breadwinners were diminished. Yet because
Wiesenfeld involved benefits that would allow mothers to stay home with
their children, Ginsburg went further here, arguing that denigrating
93
men’s contributions as caregivers was also impermissible. By
championing a man who did not conform to gender stereotypes, she
challenged both breadwinner and caregiver stereotypes simultaneously—
identifying reliance on either as sex discrimination. Ginsburg’s brief to
the Supreme Court lays out this two-pronged argument clearly: To
provide survivor benefits to women but not men “reflects the familiar
stereotype that, throughout this Nation’s history, has operated to devalue
94
women’s efforts in the economic sector”; likewise, to provide
“mother’s” insurance benefits but not “father’s” devalues men’s efforts
95
in the domestic sector. Thus, “[j]ust as Paula Wiesenfeld’s status as a
breadwinner is devalued,” Ginsburg argued, “so Stephen Wiesenfeld’s
parental status is denigrated, for [the statute] recognizes the mother, to
96
the exclusion of the father, as the nurturing parent.” Relying on the
precedent established in Reed and Frontiero, Ginsburg reasoned that
“upholding the gender-based criterion [here] would require approval of
gross sex-role stereotyping as a permissible basis for legislative
97
distinction,” violating equal protection. “In providing a ‘mother’s
benefit,’ but no father’s benefit,” Congress legislated based on
impermissible sex-based assumptions: “breadwinner was synonymous
98
with father, child tender with mother.”
Consistent with its prior decisions, the Court agreed with Ginsburg
yet again, striking down the gendered provision of survivor benefits as

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 639–41; Merritt & Williams, supra note 22, at 814.
Merritt & Williams, supra note 22, at 814–15.
Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. at 640–41.
Brief for Appellee at 10–11, Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (No. 73-1892).
Id. at 16–17.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 11–12.
Id. at 16.
Id.
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99

unconstitutional. The Court looked to the statute and its legislative
history to determine that the benefit was not intended to remedy past
economic discrimination against women but instead “was intended to
permit women to elect not to work and to devote themselves to the care
100
of children.” Having determined this intent, the Court held that the
101
sex-based distinction was “entirely irrational” and could not stand:
Even in the typical family hypothesized by the Act, in which the
husband is supporting the family and the mother is caring for the
children, this result makes no sense. . . . It is no less important for a
child to be cared for by its sole surviving parent when that parent is
male rather than female. And a father, no less than a mother, has a
constitutionally protected right to the “companionship, care, custody,
and management” of “the children he has sired and raised, [which]
undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing
102
interest, protection.”

Here, the issue was not the financial dependency of a wife per se,
but rather her desire to care for her children rather than work after the
death of her husband. For the legislature to assume that a man would not
want similarly to care for his children after his wife died was to write a
gender stereotype into the law, which the Court held violated equal
103
protection.
Among the cases she litigated throughout the 1970s, Ginsburg has
described Wiesenfeld as her favorite because
Stephen Wiesenfeld was, I thought, the perfect plaintiff. His case
involved three-fold discrimination. Discrimination against the woman
as wage earner—her contributions to Social Security did not net for her
family the same benefits that a man’s contributions did. Discrimination
against Stephen as a parent, who wanted to care personally for his
child. And discrimination against the baby, who would have the
opportunity for the care of the sole surviving parent if the parent were
104
female, but not if the parent were male.

With this one case, she was able to challenge the parallel limitations that
result when “the traditional breadwinner/homemaker view of life—the
notion that it is man’s obligation to earn a living, and woman’s to care for
105
the home and children”—is embedded in the law. Despite being at the
helm of the ACLU’s Women’s Rights Project, Ginsburg actually
represented “numerically more men . . . in the Supreme Court than

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 653 (1975).
Id. at 648.
Id. at 650–51.
Id. at 651–52 (alteration in original) (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)).
Id. at 652–53.
Merritt & Williams, supra note 22, at 815.
Id. at 814.
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women.” Yet this fact is consistent with her conception of sex
discrimination as the unlawful application of gender stereotypes to men
and women. And with her many victories, Ginsburg’s vision is reflected
in the law of sex discrimination today. Wiesenfeld’s case started when a
colleague of Ginsburg’s read a letter Wiesenfeld had written to a local
paper about his story, in which he referred to “hearing a lot about
women’s lib” and, after telling his story, ended his letter with “Tell that
107
to Gloria Steinem.” But it was Ginsburg who recognized that what had
happened to him was unlawful—and who convinced the Supreme Court
to agree that denying the ability of a man to care for his children while
supporting the ability of a woman to do so is sex discrimination.

II. The Law of Gender Stereotyping Under Title VII: Workplace
Penalties for Gender Nonconformity Are Actionable
While Ginsburg focused on impermissible sex-based classifications
in state and federal statutes through the constitutional law of equal
protection, a parallel jurisprudence of sex discrimination in the
108
workplace was developing under Title VII. Initial litigation focused on
explicit sex-based distinctions in workplace hiring, promotion, and
109
benefits, including those based on generalizations about the sexes. In
the work-family context, a series of cases held that employers must
provide the same non-disability-related parental leave benefits to men
and women (Title VII does permit additional leave to women who are
110
birth mothers, solely for the disabling periods of pregnancy). From the
106. Id.
107. Id. at 815.
108. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e)–2000(e)-17 (2010). Ginsburg herself commented on the parallel line of
cases under Title VII in her brief to the Supreme Court in Reed v. Reed:
Currently, federal and state measures are beginning to offer relief from discriminatory
employment practices. Principal measures on the national level [include] . . . Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . . These developments promise some protection of the equal
right of men and women to pursue the employment for which individual talent and capacity
best equip them. But important as these federal measures are, their coverage is
limited . . . . They provide no assistance at all in the many areas apart from employment, as
in the case at bar for example, where women are relegated to second class status.
Brief for Appellant, supra note 34, at *11–12.
109. See, e.g., Int’l Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 211 (1991) (holding that
excluding women from battery-manufacturing jobs based on concerns for the women’s potential future
children was sex discrimination under Title VII); City of L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart,
435 U.S. 702, 722–23 (1978) (holding that requiring women to pay more into a pension fund based on
generalizations of women’s longevity was sex discrimination under Title VII).
110. See, e.g., Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 277 (1987); Schafer v. Bd. of
Pub. Ed. of Pitt., 903 F.2d 243, 248 (3d Cir. 1990); EEOC v. Vucitech, 842 F.2d 936, 940 (7th Cir. 1988);
EEOC v. Commonwealth Edison Co., No. 85 C 5637, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18361, at *4 (N.D. Ill.
July 1, 1985); cf. Johnson v. Univ. of Iowa, 431 F.3d 325, 332 (8th Cir. 2005) (discussing how a
biological mother and a biological father were not similarly situated for the purpose of comparing
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late 1980s onward, however, as the understanding of how stereotypes
operate to result in more subtle forms of discriminatory behavior grew,
the law evolved. In 1989, in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Supreme
Court articulated that penalizing employees at work for failing to
conform to expected gender stereotypes could amount to impermissible
111
sex discrimination under Title VII. Within ten years, in the 1998 case of
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshores Services, Inc., the Court ruled that sexual
harassment of a man by his male coworkers could also amount to sex
112
discrimination in violation of Title VII. Through these and the cases
that followed, Title VII jurisprudence defining sex discrimination
paralleled the definition Ginsburg had established under equal
protection: Distinctions or penalties at work based on gender
stereotypes—or an individual’s failure to conform to them—may
constitute sex discrimination against women and men.
A. “Masculine” Women: PRICE WATERHOUSE V. HOPKINS
In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court articulated the
“gender stereotyping theory” under Title VII: When women are
penalized at work because they do not conform to expected stereotypes
of feminine behavior—how women should look or behave—that is
113
evidence of unlawful sex discrimination. Ann Hopkins had worked
successfully as a senior manager in the Washington, D.C. office of
national accounting firm Price Waterhouse for five years when she was
114
proposed for firm partnership. At the time (1982), only seven of the
firm’s 662 partners were women, and Hopkins was the only woman out
115
of eighty-eight proposed for partnership that year. Hopkins’s work
contributions in the year prior to the partnership proposal were
unmatched by any of the other candidates; several partners “praised her
character as well as her accomplishments, describing her . . . as ‘an
outstanding professional’ . . . [with] a ‘deft touch,’ a ‘strong character,
116
independence and integrity.’” Yet she also had critics, who faulted her
117
for “abrasiveness,” “brusqueness,” and a lack of “interpersonal skills,”
which made her at times “overly aggressive, unduly harsh, difficult to

their leave under Title VII).
111. 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989).
112. 523 U.S. 75, 81–82 (1998).
113. 490 U.S. at 250 (“In the specific context of sex stereotyping, an employer who acts on the
basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of
gender.”).
114. Id. at 233.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 234.
117. Id. at 236.
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work with and impatient.” When a decision on the proposal to make
her a partner was put on hold for a year and then ultimately denied, she
119
sued for sex discrimination under Title VII.
Evidence showed that criticism of Hopkins related to the fact that
she was a woman: Had she been a man, she would not have been faulted
120
equally (in fact she may have been praised) for her behavior. As the
Supreme Court recounted in its decision: “One partner described her as
‘macho’; another suggested that she ‘overcompensated for being a
121
woman’; a third advised her to take ‘a course at charm school.’” When
told she would not make partner, Hopkins was told that “to improve her
chances for partnership . . . [she] should ‘walk more femininely, talk
more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair
122
styled, and wear jewelry.’” While Hopkins was an outstanding achiever,
she was faulted for not performing her gender in a way that matched a
sex-based stereotype of how women should behave. Other female
candidates for partnership “were viewed favorably if partners believed
they maintained their femin[in]ity while becoming effective professional
managers”; the problem was not necessarily that Hopkins was a woman,
but that she was not a feminine woman in a workplace where “[t]o be
123
identified as a ‘women’s lib[b]er’ was regarded as [a] negative comment.”
As the Court explained, the criticisms of Hopkins “stemmed from an
124
impermissibly cabined view of the proper behavior of women,” and, by
“giving . . . effect to . . . comments that resulted from sex stereotyping,”
Price Waterhouse “unlawfully discriminated against Hopkins on the
125
basis of sex.” Citing early Title VII precedent from the 1970s, the Court
made its view explicit:
As for the legal relevance of sex stereotyping, we are beyond the day
when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting
that they matched the stereotype associated with their group, for “[i]n
forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because of their
sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate
126
treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.”

118. Id. at 234–35.
119. Id. at 231–32.
120. Id. at 251 (“An employer who objects to aggressiveness in women but whose positions require
this trait places women in an intolerable and impermissible catch 22: out of a job if they behave
aggressively and out of a job if they do not. Title VII lifts women out of this bind.”).
121. Id. at 235 (citations omitted).
122. Id. (quoting Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1117 (D.D.C. 1985)).
123. Id. at 236 (alterations in original) (quoting Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109,
1117 (D.D.C. 1985)).
124. Id. at 236–37.
125. Id. at 237.
126. Id. at 251 (alteration in original) (quoting City of L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart,
435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)).
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To help establish the link between gender stereotypes and the
actions taken against Hopkins, her attorneys provided expert testimony
from a social psychologist about how “the partnership selection process
127
at Price Waterhouse was likely influenced by sex stereotyping.” Yet,
writing for the plurality, Justice Brennan noted that “[i]t takes no special
training to discern sex stereotyping in a description of an aggressive
female employee as requiring ‘a course at charm school’” and that, “if an
employee’s flawed ‘interpersonal skills’ can be corrected by a soft-hued
suit or a new shade of lipstick,” it is likely her sex that is the basis for the
criticism, “motivated by stereotypical notions about women’s proper
128
deportment.” Writing separately in a concurrence, Justice O’Connor
went even further to identify that the stereotypical comments constituted
direct evidence that sex discrimination played a significant role in the
denial of Hopkins’s partnership—meaning the comments were themselves
129
sex discrimination, without the factfinder having to draw an inference.
As it had done in the equal protection cases of the 1970s, here the
Supreme Court established that, in the context of Title VII, embedding
gender stereotypes and penalizing individuals for failing to conform to
130
them may constitute sex discrimination.
B. “Feminine” Men: ONCALE V. SUNDOWNER OFFSHORE SERVICES, INC.
A decade after Price Waterhouse, in the 1998 case of Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., the Supreme Court established that
when a man is sexually harassed at work by other men, he may claim
131
Joseph Oncale was working as a
actionable sex discrimination.
roustabout on an all-male crew on an oil platform in the Gulf of Mexico
when he was “forcibly subjected to sex-related, humiliating actions” by
and in front of his male coworkers, “physically assaulted . . . in a sexual
132
manner, and . . . threatened . . . with rape.” After his complaints to his

127. Id. at 235.
128. Id. at 256.
129. Id. at 275, 277 (O’Connor, J. concurring). As Justice O’Connor described it in her concurrence:
It is as if Ann Hopkins were sitting in the hall outside the room where partnership decisions
were being made. As the partners filed in to consider her candidacy, she heard several of
them make sexist remarks in discussing her suitability for partnership. As the
decisionmakers exited the room, she was told by one of those privy to the decisionmaking
process that her gender was a major reason for the rejection of her partnership bid.
Id. at 272–73.
130. Id. at 251–52 (majority opinion). While the Court noted that stereotypical remarks “do not
inevitably prove that gender played a part in a particular employment decision” and that a “plaintiff
must show that the employer actually relied on her gender in making its decision,” it held that
“stereotyped remarks can certainly be evidence that gender played a part.” Id. at 251.
131. 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998).
132. Id. at 77.
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supervisors and his employer’s safety compliance clerk went nowhere
and fearing that, if he did not leave, he “would be raped or forced to
have sex,” he eventually quit, with the request that his records show
133
“that he ‘voluntarily left due to sexual harassment and verbal abuse.’”
When Oncale sued for sex discrimination under Title VII, the trial
and appellate courts ruled against him, relying on prior cases that held
that, as a male, “Oncale . . . has no cause of action under Title VII for
134
harassment by male co-workers.” Citing precedent establishing that
sexual harassment amounted to discrimination under Title VII and that
Title VII protected men as well as women and regardless of whether “the
135
plaintiff and the defendant . . . are of the same sex,” a unanimous
136
Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia
Supreme Court disagreed.
explained that, although male-on-male harassment was not the principal
objective of Congress in enacting Title VII, “statutory prohibitions often
137
go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils.”
Thus, while “[c]ourts and juries have found the inference of
discrimination easy to draw in most male-female sexual harassment
situations,” he reasoned, “harassing conduct need not be motivated by
sexual desire to support an inference of discrimination on the basis of
138
sex.” Under this holding, the Court explained, a factfinder “might
reasonably find such discrimination” if a victim is harassed by a harasser
of the same sex but “in such sex-specific and derogatory terms . . . as to
make it clear that the harasser is motivated by general hostility to the
139
presence of [the victim’s sex] in the workplace.”
Despite the fact that Joseph Oncale was a married, heterosexual
man with two children, the Court held that, when he was singled out and
harassed by other men in a sexually derogatory manner, this was
140
actionable discrimination “because of sex” under Title VII. Indeed, as
Oncale argued in his brief, “there is no type of conduct more repulsive to
the nonconsenting heterosexual male and more certain to drive him from
141
the work place than that engaged in by the defendants in this case.”
The conduct was “degrading and humiliating” specifically “because of
142
In recognizing that sexual
[Oncale’s] sexual identity as a man.”

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 79.
Id. at 75, 78–79.
Id. at 79.
Id. at 80.
Id.
Id. at 82.
Brief for Petitioner, Oncale, 523 U.S. 75 (No. 96-568), 1997 WL 458826, at *19.
Id.
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harassment whereby men denigrate and threaten another man’s sexuality
143
could be actionable sex discrimination, the Court signaled its agreement.
C. Title VII Gender Stereotyping Today: The Progeny of PRICE
WATERHOUSE and ONCALE
In the wake of Price Waterhouse and Oncale, the law of gender
stereotyping and harassment under Title VII has evolved to hold that the
gender stereotyping theory under Title VII applies to men, too. Under
the law of Title VII today, when a man is penalized or harassed at work
for failing to conform to a gender stereotype of masculine behavior, he
can allege that he has been discriminated against because of sex. While a
full discussion of the development of this case law is beyond the scope of
144
this Article, several key cases highlight the progression of the Title VII
gender stereotyping theory and provide examples of the protections it
affords to men for failure to conform to masculine norms.
Predating the Oncale decision by a year, in the 1997 case Doe v. City
of Belleville, the Seventh Circuit applied Price Waterhouse to hold that
harassing a man because his appearance or behavior did not conform to
male stereotypes constituted impermissible harassment because of sex
145
under Title VII. Twin brothers sued for sex discrimination in violation
of Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause after being “subjected to a

143. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81–82 (“Whatever evidentiary route the plaintiff chooses to follow, he or she
must always prove that the conduct at issue was not merely tinged with offensive sexual connotations, but
actually constituted ‘discrimina[tion] . . . because of . . . sex.’” (alterations in original)). While Oncale may
not have been a “feminine” man, clearly targeted for harassment based on his outward gender
nonconformity, the harassment he endured was a way of “feminizing” him—denigrating him by
treating him as a woman. News accounts of the case note clearly that Oncale was a married
heterosexual man with two children; yet he also went by the nickname “Jody” and was smaller in
stature, five feet, four inches and 140 pounds. See Dorothy Atcheson, Assault with a Sexual Weapon,
Out, Dec./Jan. 1997–1998, at 42, 44.
144. For discussion of the development of this case law over time, including the limitations of this
theory as applied in the context of sexual orientation and dress and appearance codes, see, for
example, Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The
Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 Yale L.J. 1, 2–3 (1995); Joel Wm.
Friedman, Gender Nonconformity and the Unfulfilled Promise of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
14 Duke J. Gender L. & Pol’y 205 (2007); Jonathan A. Hardage, Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant
Enterprises, Inc., and the Legacy of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins: Does Title VII Prohibit
“Effeminacy” Discrimination?, 54 Ala. L. Rev. 193 (2002); Stephen J. Nathans, Twelve Years After
Price Waterhouse and Still No Success for “Hopkins in Drag”: The Lack of Protection for the Male
Victim of Gender Stereotyping Under Title VII, 46 Vill. L. Rev. 713, 713–14 (2001); cf. Philip
McGough, Same-Sex Harassment: Do Either Price Waterhouse or Oncale Support the Ninth Circuit’s
Holding in Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, Inc. That Same-Sex Harassment Based on Failure
to Conform to Gender Stereotypes is Actionable? 22 Hofstra Lab. & Emp. L.J. 206 (2004); Colleen
Keating, Extending Title VII Protection to Non-Gender-Conforming Men, Modern Am., Fall 2008, at
82.
145. 119 F.3d 563, 566 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated and remanded in light of Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
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relentless campaign of harassment by their male coworkers” at their
146
summer landscaping job for Belleville. One of the brothers, referred to
as “H. Doe” and who wore an earring, was particularly subjected to
gender-based harassment including being called “fag,” “queer,” or
“bitch,” asked whether he was a boy or a girl, being threatened with
sexual assault “out [in] the woods,” and, after one coworker announced,
“I’m going to finally find out if you are a girl or a guy,” being pinned
147
Relying on Price
against a wall and grabbed by the testicles.
Waterhouse, the Seventh Circuit held that this constituted sex
discrimination as H. Doe “was singled out for . . . abuse because the way
in which he projected the sexual aspect of his personality (. . . his gender)
did not conform to his coworkers’ view of appropriate masculine
148
behavior.” Thus, just as Price Waterhouse’s “reliance upon gender
stereotypes” to deny Ann Hopkins partnership was because of her sex,
149
the harassment H. Doe endured was also because of his sex. The
Seventh Circuit explained,
[A] man who is harassed because his voice is soft, his physique is slight,
his hair is long, or because in some other respect he exhibits his
masculinity in a way that does not meet his coworkers’ idea of how men
150
are to appear and behave, is harassed “because of” his sex.

Whether a plaintiff is male or female, the court continued, the analysis
should be the same: “The question in both cases is whether a particular
action . . . can be attributed to sex,” and “reliance upon stereotypical
notions about how men and women should appear and behave . . .
151
reasonably suggests that the answer to that question is yes.”
Five years later, the Ninth Circuit applied Price Waterhouse and
Oncale in two cases that again extended gender stereotyping and sexual
harassment theories under Title VII to men. In 2001, in Nichols v. Azteca
Restaurant Enterprises, Inc., the Ninth Circuit held (like the Seventh
Circuit had in Doe v. Belleville) that a man who was harassed for failing
to meet a stereotype of masculinity could allege sex discrimination under
152
Title VII. Antonio Sanchez, who worked as a restaurant host and food
server, was “subjected to a relentless campaign of insults, name-calling,
and vulgarities” by his male coworkers and even a supervisor, who
“referred to Sanchez . . . as ‘she’ and ‘her,’” criticized him “for walking
146. Id.
147. Id. at 566–67.
148. Id. at 580.
149. Id. at 580–81 (“Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins makes clear that Title VII does not permit an
employee to be treated adversely because his . . . conduct does not conform to stereotypical gender
roles.” (citation omitted)).
150. Id. at 581 (emphasis added).
151. Id. at 575, 581.
152. 256 F.3d 864, 869 (9th Cir. 2001).
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and carrying his serving tray ‘like a woman,’” and called him, among
153
other things, a “female whore.” Relying on Price Waterhouse and
Oncale, the Ninth Circuit agreed with Sanchez that “he was harassed
because he failed to conform to a male stereotype” and that “the holding
in Price Waterhouse applies with equal force to a man who is
154
discriminated against for acting too feminine.” The next year, in Rene
v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., the Ninth Circuit held that another man, who
was gay, was also subject to sex discrimination based on sexual
harassment: His sexual orientation was irrelevant where his harassment
155
was sufficiently sex-based to violate Title VII. Medina Rene, who
worked as a “butler” for “wealthy, high-profile” hotel guests, was
harassed almost daily for two years by his male coworkers, who called
him “sweetheart” and “muñeca” (“doll”) and subjected him to “offensive
physical conduct of a sexual nature,” including caressing, hugging, and
156
“touch[ing his] body like they would to a woman.” Here the majority
157
focused on Oncale, noting that “Oncale did not need to show that he
was treated worse than members of the opposite sex. It was enough to
158
show that he suffered discrimination in comparison to other men.”
Likewise, Rene “was singled out from his other male co-workers for this
treatment,” and “treated differently—and disadvantageously—based on
159
sex,” which is “precisely what Title VII forbids.”
Most recently, in 2011 in Glenn v. Brumby, the Eleventh Circuit
applied these and related precedents and joined a number of other
federal courts to hold that firing a transgendered employee because of
the employee’s transition from one gender to another was penalizing the
employee for gender nonconformity and, therefore, unlawful sex
160
discrimination. When Vandiver Elizabeth Glenn, who was born a
biological male, was fired from her job with a state agency because of her
intended gender transition from male to female, she sued for sex
161
discrimination in violation of equal protection. The Eleventh Circuit

153. Id. at 870.
154. Id. at 874.
155. 305 F.3d 106i, 1063–64 (9th Cir. 2002).
156. Id. at 1064.
157. In addition, the concurrence, citing Price Waterhouse, said the case presented “actionable
gender stereotyping harassment” and was “indistinguishable” from Nichols. Id. at 1068 (Pregerson, J.,
concurring).
158. Id. at 1067 (majority opinion).
159. Id.
160. 663 F.3d 1312, 1314, 1316–18 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing similar holdings from the First, Sixth, and
Ninth Circuits and district courts in Arizona, New York, Pennsylvania, Texas, and the District of
Columbia); see Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2004) (explaining how Price
Waterhouse “eviscerated” prior holdings to the contrary in the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits).
161. Id. at 1313–14. As a public employee, Glenn brought her claim as a constitutional violation of
equal protection under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, rather than under Title VII, but the analysis is applicable to
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held that “discriminating against someone on the basis of his or her
162
gender non-conformity constitutes sex-based discrimination.” To reach
its holding, the court drew upon a wide swath of precedent defining sex
discrimination, citing not only Price Waterhouse, Oncale, Doe v. Belleville,
and Nichols, but also the early cases litigated by Ginsburg, including
Frontiero and Wiesenfeld. As the court explained:
All persons . . . are protected from discrimination on the basis of
gender stereotype. For example, courts have held that plaintiffs cannot
be discriminated against for wearing jewelry that was considered too
effeminate, carrying a serving tray too gracefully, or taking too active a
role in child-rearing. An individual cannot be punished because of his
or her perceived gender-nonconformity. . . . The nature of the
discrimination is the same; it may differ in degree but not in kind, and
163
discrimination on this basis is a form of sex-based discrimination . . . .

Surveying the field, the court emphasized that penalizing an
employee for gender nonconformity—including in the context of child
164
rearing —is sex discrimination based on sex stereotyping. Harkening
back to Ginsburg’s initial vision, the court noted, “Ever since the
Supreme Court began to apply heightened scrutiny to sex-based
classifications, its consistent purpose has been to eliminate discrimination
165
on the basis of gender stereotypes.”

III. The Law of Gender Stereotyping Under the FMLA: Work,
Family, and Entrenched Gender Stereotypes
Advances in gender equality through challenges to sex-based
stereotypes in statutes and in the workplace were sparked by Ginsburg’s
equal protection cases and furthered by Title VII jurisprudence in Price
Waterhouse, Oncale, and their progeny. Yet while antidiscrimination law
made holding men and women to gender-based stereotypes unlawful in
the market sphere, rooting out stereotypes tied to the domestic sphere
166
proved more difficult. The passage of the FMLA in 1993, which
provides job-protected leave for both women and men to care for new
children or seriously ill children or family members, was designed to
help. With its subsequent interpretation of the FMLA in Nevada
Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, the Supreme Court made the
link between equal protection, Title VII, the FMLA, and gender

Title VII cases as well. See id. at 1321 (“[There is] ample direct evidence to support the . . . conclusion
that [Glenn’s employer] acted on the basis of Glenn’s gender non-conformity [so that] [i]f this were a
Title VII case, the analysis would end here.”).
162. Id. at 1316.
163. Id. at 1318–19 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
164. See infra Parts III, IV.
165. Glenn, 663 F.3d at 1319.
166. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654 (2010).
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stereotypes around work and family clear. Like equal protection and
Title VII prohibitions against sex discrimination, the FMLA was
designed to rid the workplace of gender stereotypes, particularly where
those stereotypes remain strongly entrenched at the intersection of work
168
and family.
A. Parallel Stereotypes of Breadwinner and Caregiver: NEVADA
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES V. HIBBS
The FMLA provides certain employees, both men and women, who
work for a covered employer with up to twelve weeks of unpaid, jobprotected family and medical leave to care for a new child; a seriously ill
child, parent, or spouse; or the employee’s own serious health
169
condition. A decade after the FMLA’s passage, in Hibbs, the Supreme
Court faced the question of whether a state employee could sue his
170
employer for monetary damages under the FMLA. In answering this
question, the Court highlighted the role of sex stereotypes at the
intersection of work and family in the persistence of gender inequality at
171
work.
Williams Hibbs was a social worker in his state’s Department of
Human Services when his wife, Dianne, was severely injured in a car
accident, requiring neck surgery that left her addicted to pain
172
medication, clinically depressed, and, at one point, suicidal. Her
doctors recommended a second surgery to correct problems from a metal
plate that had been inserted in her neck and recommended “personal
173
care by her husband in the interim.” Hibbs was granted twelve weeks
of intermittent FMLA leave but was later ordered to return to work and
174
terminated when he failed to do so. When he sued for violation of the
FMLA, the district court granted summary judgment against him based
on Eleventh Amendment immunity barring such a suit against a state
175
employer; the Ninth Circuit reversed, and the Supreme Court affirmed.
The question turned on “whether Congress acted within its constitutional

167. See 538 U.S. 721, 735–37 (2003).
168. Id.
169. Covered employers include private employers with fifty or more employees and all public
agencies, including local, state, and federal employers and public schools. Eligible employees include
those who have worked for over one year and for 1250 hours in the prior year to their leave, and who
work at a worksite with fifty or more employees in a seventy-five mile radius. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–
2654; U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Fact Sheet #28: The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, at 1 (2010).
170. 538 U.S. at 721, 736–37.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 725; Brief for Respondent, Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (No. 01-1368), 2002 WL 31655020 at *6.
173. Brief for Respondent, supra note 172, at *6–7.
174. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 725.
175. Id. at 725, 740.
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authority when it sought to abrogate the States’ immunity [and allow
lawsuits against state employers] for purposes of the FMLA’s family176
leave provision.” To answer this question required determining the
legislative intent behind the FMLA.
In her brief to the Supreme Court on Hibbs’s behalf, attorney and
law professor Cornelia Pillard highlighted how the FMLA was enacted to
remedy sex discrimination and “specifically targets the very stereotypes
about family and work that this Court has long recognized as a basis for
177
its own heightened scrutiny of sex-based classifications.” In a section
entitled “The FMLA Responds to Unconstitutional Sex Discrimination
as This Court Defines It” and citing precedent from Ginsburg’s equal
protection cases, including Frontiero, Pillard explained:
This Court’s equal protection jurisprudence is designed to bar state
reliance on “outdated misconceptions concerning the role of females in
the home rather than in the ‘marketplace and world of ideas,’” and to
uproot the correlative sex bias against men when they are presumptively
cast as family “breadwinners.” In recognition of the pervasive part that
sex-role stereotypes, particularly those about work and family roles,
have played in maintaining inequality between men and women, this
Court skeptically scrutinizes discrimination not just against females,
but against males as well. When States treat female and male
employees differently due to sex-based assumptions about their family
responsibilities, they violate the Equal Protection Clause as this Court
178
has interpreted it.

Paralleling Ginsburg’s use of male plaintiffs in the 1970s equal protection
cases, here too a male plaintiff illustrated the goal behind the FMLA: to
provide family leave to men and women equally to reduce gender
stereotypes about the division of family care that perpetuate sex
discrimination.
Agreeing with the plaintiff, the Court held that because Congress
enacted the FMLA to remedy a proven history of States’ reliance on “the
pervasive sex-role stereotype that caring for family members is women’s
work” in their administration of family leave benefits, Congress had
acted validly (within its enforcement powers in Section 5 of the
179
Fourteenth Amendment) to enforce equal protection. Writing for the
majority, Justice Rehnquist described in detail the relationship between
gender stereotyping and the intersection of work and family:

176. Id. at 726–27.
177. Brief for Respondent, supra note 172, at *11.
178. Id. at *22 (citations omitted) (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 190–99 (1976), and
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 681 (1973)).
179. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 725–27, 731. A full discussion of the Eleventh Amendment issues is beyond
the scope of this Article. For a more detailed discussion, see Joan C. Williams, Hibbs as a Federalism
Case; Hibbs as a Maternal Wall Case, 73 U. Cin. L. Rev. 365 (2004).
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The impact of the discrimination targeted by the FMLA is
significant. . . . Stereotypes about women’s domestic roles are
reinforced by parallel stereotypes presuming a lack of domestic
responsibilities for men. Because employers continued to regard the
family as the woman’s domain, they often denied men similar
accommodations or discouraged them from taking leave. These
mutually reinforcing stereotypes created a self-fulfilling cycle of
discrimination that forced women to continue to assume the role of
primary family caregiver, and fostered employers’ stereotypical views
180
about women’s commitment to work and their value as employees.

Given the intractable problem of separate spheres stereotyping that
had not been resolved adequately by the passage of Title VII and its
amendment to clearly prohibit pregnancy discrimination, Rehnquist
explained, Congress enacted the FMLA to remove the stigma of
caregiving solely from women employees, “thereby reducing employers’
incentives to engage in discrimination by basing hiring and promotion
181
decisions on stereotypes.” The FMLA was a federal law “narrowly
targeted at the faultline between work and family—precisely where sex182
based overgeneralization has been and remains strongest.” Once again,
as it had done in the equal protection and Title VII cases, in Hibbs the
Court identified sex-based stereotypes as at the root of the sex
183
discrimination the FMLA sought to remedy.
B. Gender Stereotyping in FMLA Cases Brought by Male
Caregivers
The Court’s interpretation in Hibbs that the legislative intent behind
the FMLA was to root out gender stereotypes in family caregiving is
reflected in the evidence in FMLA lawsuits brought by male caregivers.
To allege a violation of the FMLA, a man who is penalized at work for
taking family caregiving leave must prove that he is protected by the Act
(an “eligible employee” working for a “covered employer”) and that his
employer either interfered with his ability to take entitled leave or
discriminated or retaliated against him for doing so; he need not prove
184
any intentional sex discrimination by his employer. Yet as cases
brought by male plaintiffs under the FMLA demonstrate, the penalties
they experience at work for taking a caregiving leave often reflect hostility
185
to their transgressing the gender stereotype of man as breadwinner.

180. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 736.
181. Id. at 736–37.
182. Id. at 738.
183. Id. at 736–38.
184. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654 (2010).
185. For a discussion of male caregiving as a stereotype “transgression,” see Laura T. Kessler,
Transgressive Caregiving, 33 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1 (2005).
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Many such cases provide direct evidence of gender stereotyping where a
man has sought caregiving leave—usually statements that women, and not
men, should be doing the family caregiving.
The examples abound: An airline maintenance parts foreman who
sought intermittent FMLA leave to care for his newborn was told to let
186
his wife take care of the baby because he “ha[d] a shop to run.” A
police officer who had taken FMLA leave for the births of his three
children was passed over for promotions given to lower-ranking officers
multiple times; supervisors had repeatedly derided him in front of his
peers, including one who said, “Congratulations for taking the most time
187
off for having a baby and not actually having the baby.” An accountant
who asked for FMLA leave for the birth of his child was told he could
not take leave if his employer was “really busy” and that he did not have
188
the same rights to leave as his female colleagues. When an equipment
operator’s wife, step-daughter, and infant son all developed serious
medical conditions and the operator requested FMLA leave, a supervisor
asked why the mother or “real father” of his step-daughter could not
189
take care of her—she had brain cancer. And when a lumber company
manager trainee requested FMLA to care for his sick father, his
supervisor warned the trainee he would be “cutting his own throat” if he
190
took the leave; when the trainee did, he was fired.
Other examples show men who sought caregiving leave being
“feminized” by the same types of stereotypes that working mothers
experience: that they are unreliable, uncommitted, and that work and
191
family are incompatible. An aircraft mechanic was disciplined and then

186. Beyst v. Pinnacle Airlines, Inc., No. 07-10927, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45468, at *34–36 (E.D.
Mich. June 11, 2008). In addition to his FMLA claims, Beyst also brought a claim of gender
discrimination in violation of state law, based on the direct evidence of his supervisor’s statement: “Let
your wife take care of your kid. You have a shop to run.” Id. at *34. The court held that this statement
was not sufficient direct evidence to prove his claim and that he had not properly pled a circumstantial
case of gender discrimination. Id. at *34–39.
187. Wells v. City of Montgomery, No. 1:04CV425, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23013, at *5–8 (S.D.
Ohio Apr. 25, 2006).
188. Rabe v. Nationwide Logistics, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1073 (E.D. Mo. 2008).
189. Aldridge v. Indian Elec. Coop., No. 07-CV-633-HDC-PJC, 2008 WL 1777480., at *1, *5 (N.D.
Okla. Apr. 17, 2008).
190. Final Brief of the Appellee, Bates v. 84 Lumber Co., 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 23640 (6th Cir.
Sept. 14, 2006) (No. 04-6493, 05-5544, 05-5736), 2005 U.S. 6th Cir. Briefs LEXIS 297 at *2.
191. See, e.g., Drew v. Plaza Constr. Corp., No. 09 Civ. 2129 (VM), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8699, at
*3–4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2010) (describing how a system support technician on FMLA leave to care for
his father with leukemia was asked why his father needed so much attention and was told by a
supervisor “you’re killing us”); Viera v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. CV-07-5010-EFS, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 15621, at *7–8 (E.D. Wash. Feb. 27, 2009) (involving a cashier who was called “unreliable” for
taking FMLA leave to care for his children during his wife’s high-risk pregnancy); Rhoades v. Stewart
Enters., Inc., No. 01-5044, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 550, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 3, 2003) (describing how a
salesperson who requested a day of sick leave because his mother was “gravely ill” was terminated
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terminated after using FMLA leave to care for his pregnant wife, who
suffered from gestational diabetes, because of his “lack of
192
dependability.” A store operations manager’s supervisor said he had
“lost confidence” in the manager because he took a week of FMLA leave
during the store’s biannual inventory period; the inventory occurred two
days after the birth of the manager’s baby, while his wife and newborn
193
were still in the hospital due to delivery complications. A carpenter on
FMLA leave to care for his father who was recovering from a heart
attack was told after being fired that it was “because no one wanted to
194
work with him.” And a waste management company laborer and
divorced father of three was told, after encountering resistance to
requests for FMLA leave to care for his son with hemophilia, that “he
195
had to decide what was more important: his job or his family.”
The evidence presented in these cases shows that FMLA violations
and retaliation against men are often an expression of gender stereotyping
at work: The idea that being an active family caregiver is inconsistent
with what it means to be a good breadwinner and man. Because the
FMLA explicitly includes men as eligible employees and does not
require proving discriminatory intent, men seeking to challenge penalties
at work based on their caregiving responsibilities at home most often
196
bring such lawsuits under the FMLA. Yet about forty percent of the
U.S. workforce does not meet the requirements to be covered by the
197
FMLA. Moreover, failing to recognize that workplace penalties against
men for not conforming to a male gender stereotype of unencumbered
breadwinner is sex discrimination is failing to address the other half of
the two-sided coin of separate spheres ideology. For this reason, the next
Part argues, these plaintiffs—and others like them—could have alleged
sex discrimination in violation of Title VII in addition to their claims
198
under the FMLA.

over the phone for “lacking commitment to his job”; the plaintiff alleged federal and state race, age,
and disability discrimination claims as well).
192. Meyer v. United Airlines, Inc., No. 08 C 0599, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11114, at *3 (N.D. Ill.
Feb. 15, 2009).
193. Blohm v. Dillard’s, Inc., 95 F. Supp. 2d 473, 476–77 (E.D.N.C. 2000).
194. Morgeson v. OK Interiors Corp., No. 1:06-cv-21, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48581, at *2 (S.D.
Ohio July 3, 2007).
195. Scott v. Allied Waste Serv. of Bucks-Mont, No. 10-105, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136202, at *17
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 23, 2010) (alleging federal and state disability discrimination and association claims as
well).
196. See Cynthia Thomas Calvert, The Ctr. for WorkLife Law, Family Responsibilities
Discrimination: Litigation Update 2010, at 10–11 (2010).
197. See Phillips, supra note 9.
198. See infra Part IV.C.
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IV. Title VII Gender Stereotyping Theory as a Remedy for the
Work-Family Conflicts of Men
As discussed in Parts I through III, three strands of jurisprudence
have established what constitutes sex discrimination based on gender
stereotypes: (1) statutes that embed sex-based stereotypes of women as
caregivers and men as breadwinners are sex discrimination in violation of
equal protection; (2) workplace sanctions or sexual harassment of
women and men for failing to conform to gender stereotypes of proper
feminine or masculine behavior are sex discrimination under Title VII;
and (3) protections for family caregiving leave under the FMLA were
intended to remedy sex discrimination based on our most entrenched
stereotypes around work and family. Over the past decade, a fourth
strand of law combining several of these theories has emerged: caregiver
discrimination (also known as “family responsibilities discrimination” or
“FRD”). While the field of caregiver discrimination encompasses a
number of existing legal theories, at the heart of this jurisprudence is the
recognition that penalizing or harassing working women based on gender
stereotypes of mothers as incompetent or uncommitted is also sex
199
This is, once again, courts recognizing that when
discrimination.
employers take action based on gender stereotypes around work and
family—in this case, stereotypes that because women should be caregivers,
they are inadequate breadwinners—this constitutes sex discrimination.
The field of caregiver discrimination applies to men as well, consistent
with Supreme Court precedent labeling as sex discrimination both policies
embedding stereotypes that keep men out of the domestic sphere (for
example, in Moritz, Wiesenfeld, and Hibbs) and workplace penalties
against men for failing to conform to masculine norms (for example, in
Price Waterhouse, Oncale, and their progeny). Under current Title VII
gender stereotyping case law and doctrine, this Part argues, men may
now allege sex discrimination when they are penalized at work for
participating in family caregiving, even without attaching their Title VII
claim to other caregiving claims (like violations of the FMLA). In the
terms of stereotyping law, a man who is penalized at work for failing to
conform to the masculine stereotype of man as breadwinner and not
200
caregiver—who is viewed as “defectively masculine” or “effeminate”
because he takes an active role in caring for his children or family
members—can now allege a Price Waterhouse-style Title VII sex
discrimination lawsuit using a gender stereotyping theory. While the
199. See Calvert, supra note 196, at 6–7; Joan C. Williams & Stephanie Bornstein, The Evolution
of “FReD”: Family Responsibilities Discrimination and Developments in the Law of Stereotyping and
Implicit Bias, 59 Hastings L.J. 1311, 1331 (2008).
200. See Joan C. Williams, Reshaping the Work-Family Debate: Why Men and Class Matter
79–91 (2010).
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EEOC and a handful of plaintiffs have recognized this theory, many
courts (and even many plaintiffs’ attorneys) have not. A wider
recognition and application of this theory has the potential to protect
caregiving men who are not covered by the FMLA. Moreover, it has the
potential to fully realize Ginsburg’s vision for remedying sex
discrimination by rooting out both of the gender stereotypes embedded
in the ideology of separate spheres.
A. Stereotyping Mothers as Poor Workers
Caregiver discrimination cases encompass a range of legal theories
tied to penalties at work for caregiving responsibilities at home, including
claims under Title VII, the FMLA, the Americans with Disabilities Act,
202
state statutes, and common law. Yet underlying all of these claims is
the operation of sex-based stereotypes around work and family: the idea
that being a good employee is incongruous with being a good mother or
203
family caregiver.
1.

Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free School District

The 2004 case Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free School
District, viewed as a key case in caregiver discrimination jurisprudence,
204
made clear that stereotyping of mothers is unlawful sex stereotyping. In
Back, the Second Circuit established that penalizing an employee based
on gender stereotypes of mothers as uncommitted (more caregiver than
breadwinner) was impermissible sex discrimination in violation of equal
protection and, importantly, that evidence of sex-based stereotypes alone
could be evidence of sex discrimination, even without evidence of a
205
“comparator” (a similarly situated man who was treated better). Elana

201. See supra Part IV.B.1. and C.
202. See Calvert, supra note 196, at 10–11; Williams & Bornstein, supra note 199, at 1322.
203. See Calvert, supra note 196, at 10–11; Williams & Bornstein, supra note 199, at 1328.
204. 365 F.3d 107, 113 (2d Cir. 2004).
205. Id. at 121–22. While Back was germinal in its holding that stereotyping of mothers could be
gender stereotyping in violation of Title VII and equal protection without comparator evidence, prior
to Back, many circuit courts had also held that stereotypical comments related to an employee’s
pregnancy or motherhood could constitute evidence of sex discrimination. Id.; see, e.g., Lust v. Sealy,
Inc., 383 F.3d 580, 583–84 (7th Cir. 2004) (involving an employer who assumed that the plaintiff would
not want to relocate for her job because she had children); Laxton v. Gap Inc., 333 F.3d 572, 583 (5th
Cir. 2003) (involving an employer who reacted angrily to the plaintiff’s pregnancy); Gorski v. N.H.
Dept. of Corr., 290 F.3d 466, 473–74 (1st Cir. 2002) (involving an employer who commented
derogatorily about the plaintiff’s pregnancy); Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217
F.3d 46, 55–56 (1st Cir. 2000) (involving an employer who implied that the plaintiff could not manage
both a job and a family); Sheehan v. Donlen Corp., 173 F.3d 1039, 1043 (7th Cir. 1999) (involving an
employer who told the plaintiff, upon termination, that now she would have time to take care of her
children); Troy v. Bay State Computer Grp., Inc., 141 F.3d 378, 380–81 (1st Cir. 1998) (involving an
employer who suggested that the plaintiff was unable to perform her job due to her pregnancy);
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Back was a school psychologist who, for the first two years at her public
elementary school, received consistently excellent evaluations from her
two female supervisors, with ratings of “outstanding” or “superior” (the
two highest marks) in most categories on her performance evaluations
206
and repeated assurances that she would receive tenure. As her review
for tenure with the school approached in her third year—and after she
had taken a three-month maternity leave to give birth to a child—her
207
evaluations changed. According to Back, one supervisor asked “how
she was ‘planning on spacing [her] offspring,’” advised Back to “wait
until [her son] was in kindergarten to have another child,” and suggested
“maybe [Back] reconsider whether [she] could be a mother and do this
job” because the supervisor “did not know how [Back] could possibly do
208
this job with children.” Both supervisors told Back “that it was ‘not
209
possible for [her] to be a good mother and have this job.’” They also
questioned whether Back’s “apparent commitment to [her] job was an
act,” and whether, once she was granted tenure, she “would not show the
210
same level of commitment . . . because [she] had little ones at home.”
When Back was ultimately denied tenure and her probationary job status
211
terminated, she filed suit for sex discrimination.
In its ruling in favor of Back, the Second Circuit held that
“stereotyping about the qualities of mothers is a form of gender
discrimination” that “can be determined in the absence of evidence
212
about how the employer in question treated fathers.” To make her
case, Back relied “upon a Price Waterhouse ‘stereotyping’ theory,” under
which she argued that “comments made about a woman’s inability to
combine work and motherhood are direct evidence of [sex]
213
discrimination.” Writing for the Second Circuit, Judge Calabresi
Barbano v. Madison Cnty., 922 F.2d 139, 143 (2d Cir. 1990) (involving an employer who questioned an
applicant about her plans to get pregnant based on a desire not to hire a woman who would get
pregnant and quit); Coble v. Hot Springs Sch. Dist. No. 6, 682 F.2d 721, 726 (8th Cir. 1982) (involving
an employer who implied that the plaintiff was less available and dedicated to the job because she had
a family).
206. Back, 365 F.3d at 114–15.
207. Id. at 115.
208. Id.
209. Id. (alteration in original).
210. Id.
211. Id. at 113. Like in Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1314, 1316–17 (11th Cir. 2011), discussed
in Part II.C, as a public employee, Back brought her claim as a constitutional violation of equal
protection under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, rather than under Title VII, but this difference is irrelevant as the
court applied Title VII precedent in the case. See Back, 365 F.3d at 119–21, 123–24 (applying Price
Waterhouse to hold that Back had proved evidence of sex stereotyping that could amount to sex
discrimination and applying the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting standard to find that Back met
her burden to survive summary judgment).
212. Back, 365 F.3d at 113.
213. Id. at 119.
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explained that being penalized at work based on an assumption that you
will conform to a gender stereotype that is devalued is also evidence of
sex discrimination:
It is the law . . . that “stereotyped remarks can certainly be evidence
that gender played a part” in an adverse employment decision. The
principle of Price Waterhouse . . . applies as much to the supposition
that a woman will conform to a gender stereotype (and therefore will
not, for example, be dedicated to her job), as to the supposition that a
woman is unqualified for a position because she does not conform to a
gender stereotype.
. . . Just as “[i]t takes no special training to discern sex stereotyping in a
description of an aggressive female employee as requiring ‘a course at
charm school’” so it takes no special training to discern stereotyping in
the view that a woman cannot “be a good mother” and have a job that
requires long hours, or in the statement that a mother who received
tenure “would not show the same level of commitment [she] had
214
shown because [she] had little ones at home.”

Thus, based on the precedent established in Price Waterhouse, judging a
woman against a stereotype of feminine behavior and penalizing her at
work based on that judgment is evidence of sex discrimination—whether
you fault her for failing to conform or for assuming she will conform to the
stereotype that women should be caregivers rather than breadwinners.
To further clarify the legal standard for when gender stereotyping
occurs, the court linked Elana Back’s experience not only to Price
Waterhouse but also to stereotyping against men, both in the Oncale line
of cases and the work-family context in Hibbs. Noting that to determine
what constitutes a gender-based stereotype, courts must look to “the
215
particular context in which it arises . . . without undue formalization,”
the court looked to Doe v. Belleville as an example, specifically the
holding that harassing a man who “exhibits his masculinity in a way that
does not meet his coworkers’ idea of how men are to appear and
216
behave” constitutes harassment because of sex. The Supreme Court
provided another example in Hibbs by noting that “mutually reinforcing
stereotypes” of women as caregivers and men as breadwinners can “lead
to subtle discrimination that may be difficult to detect on a case-by-case
217
basis.” Summarizing its position, the court explained that “[t]he
question . . . is whether a particular action . . . can be attributed to sex”
and that “reliance upon stereotypical notions about how men and women

214.
(1989)).
215.
216.
217.

Id. at 119–20 (citations omitted) (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251, 256
Id.
Id. at 120 n.10 (quoting Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 581–82 (7th Cir. 1997)).
Id. at 121 (quoting Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 738 (2003)).
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should appear and behave . . . reasonably suggests that the answer to that
218
question is yes.”
Hibbs makes pellucidly clear . . . that, at least where stereotypes are
considered, the notions that mothers are insufficiently devoted to
work, and that work and motherhood are incompatible, are properly
considered to be, themselves, gender-based. Hibbs explicitly called the
stereotype that “women’s family duties trump those of the workplace”
a “gender stereotype,” and cited a number of state [leave laws] . . . as
evidence of “pervasive sex-role stereotype that caring for family
219
members is women’s work.”

Like the direct evidence of sex stereotyping Ann Hopkins
experienced in Price Waterhouse, the explicit statements that Back would
not be committed or could not be a good employee because she was a
mother were, themselves, direct evidence of sex discrimination. While
comparator evidence might have strengthened her case, “the ultimate
issue is the reasons for the individual plaintiff’s treatment, not the
220
relative treatment of different groups within the workplace.” Nor does
the employer’s evidence that the majority of teachers hired in the year
Back was hired were women with children defeat Back’s claim, because
221
“what matters is how Back was treated.” Because “stereotypical
remarks about the incompatibility of motherhood and employment ‘can
certainly be evidence that gender played a part’ in an employment
decision,” the Second Circuit held, “stereotyping of women as caregivers
can by itself and without more be evidence of an impermissible, sex222
based motive.”
2.

Back’s Progeny

In almost a decade since the Back decision, an increasing number of
federal courts as well as the EEOC, which enforces Title VII, have held
that stereotyping of mothers may be unlawful sex discrimination under
223
Title VII. In the jurisprudence of caregiver discrimination, it is
commonly understood that harassing or penalizing a woman at work
based on the assumption that she will be less committed or less
competent because she is a mother—that she will conform to a negative
caregiver stereotype—is unlawful sex discrimination. While a full

218. Id. at 120 n.10 (quoting Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 581–82 (7th Cir. 1997)).
219. Id. at 121 (citations omitted) (quoting Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 731–
33 nn.5–6 (2003)).
220. Id. at 121 (emphasis removed) (quoting Brown v. Henderson, 257 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir.
2001)).
221. Id. at 122.
222. Id.
223. See Calvert, supra note 196, at 10–12; Williams & Bornstein, supra note 199, at 1342–43.
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discussion of this case law is beyond the scope of this Article, two
examples highlight how far the gender stereotyping theory has come in
the protections it affords to mothers under Title VII.
First, based on the evolving understanding of how stereotypes
operate in the context of work and family and on the rapidly growing
number of cases alleging caregiver discrimination, in 2007 the EEOC
issued official enforcement guidance on the subject, entitled Enforcement
Guidance: Unlawful Disparate Treatment of Workers with Caregiving
225
Responsibilities. The EEOC adopted the holding in Back as its
position, stating clearly that because “stereotypes that female caregivers
should not, will not, or cannot be committed to their jobs are sex-based,
226
employment decisions based on such stereotypes violate Title VII.” In
an in-depth discussion citing case law and social scientific evidence, the
EEOC explained the unlawful effects of employers “[r]elying on
stereotypes of traditional gender roles and the division of domestic and
workplace responsibilities” and how “gender stereotypes of caregivers
may more broadly affect perceptions of a worker’s general
227
competence.” While EEOC enforcement guidance is not formally
binding on federal courts, as the agency’s official position, it has a
228
persuasive impact both on judicial decisionmaking and on employer
229
practice in the workplace. In 2009, responding to the continued growth
of the field, the EEOC followed up with a document setting forth “best
230
practices” for employers to avoid liability for caregiver discrimination.
Second, in the 2009 case Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., the First
Circuit held that detrimental stereotyping of an individual mother could
constitute sex discrimination even when the plaintiff was passed over for
a promotion that went to another mother who had not been subject to
224. For a more complete discussion of the field of family responsibilities discrimination, see, for
example, Williams & Bornstein, supra note 199; Calvert, supra note 196; Joan C. Williams &
Stephanie Bornstein, Caregivers in the Courtroom: The Growing Trend of Family Responsibilities
Discrimination, 41 U.S.F. L. Rev. 171 (2006); Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal
Wall: Relief for Family Caregivers Who Are Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 Harv. Women’s L.J.
77 (2003).
225. EEOC, Enforcement Guidance: Unlawful Disparate Treatment of Workers with
Caregiving Responsibilities (2007).
226. Id. at 11–12.
227. Id. at 10–21.
228. See, e.g., John S. Moot, Comment, An Analysis of Judicial Deference to EEOC Interpretative
Guidelines, 1 Admin L.J. 213 (1987); Robyn S. Stoter, Note, Discrimination & Deference: Making a
Case for the EEOC’s Expertise with English-Only Rules, 53 Vill. L. Rev. 595, 623–25 nn.164–69
(2008).
229. See Mary C. Still, Family Responsibilities Discrimination and the New Institutionalism: The
Interactive Process Through Which Legal and Social Factors Produce Institutional Change,
59 Hastings L.J. 1491, 1513–14 (2008).
230. Employer Best Practices for Workers with Caregiving Responsibilities, EEOC,
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/caregiver-best-practices.html (last visited May 1, 2012).
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similar stereotyping. Laurie Chadwick was a well-performing employee
of WellPoint for nearly ten years, during which she had been
232
promoted. She was also the mother of an eleven-year-old son and sixyear-old triplets (and was taking one college course per semester), but
there was no indication that it affected her work performance; her
husband, who worked nights and weekends, was the primary caregiver
233
for the children during the day. When she was passed over for a second
promotion in favor of someone with significantly less experience and
lower performance evaluations, Chadwick sued for sex discrimination
“based on the sex-based stereotype that mothers, particularly those with
young children, neglect their work duties in favor of their presumed
234
childcare obligations.” One supervisor who challenged an answer
Chadwick gave in the interview for the promotion said, “Laurie, you are
a mother[.] [W]ould you let your kids off the hook that easy if they made
a mess in [their] room[?] [W]ould you clean it or hold them
235
accountable?” The other, the ultimate decisionmaker, said upon
learning that Chadwick had triplets, “Oh my—I did not know you had
236
triplets. Bless you!” Then, when telling Chadwick she did not get the
promotion, explained, “It was nothing you did or didn’t do. It was just
that you’re going to school, you have the kids and you just have a lot on
your plate right now.” Noting that if the three interviewers were in
Chadwick’s position, “they would feel overwhelmed,” the supervisor told
Chadwick she would be “happier with this [not working out] down the
237
road.”
When the First Circuit sided with Chadwick, it indicated just how
far the gender stereotyping theory has developed in the context of the
stereotype of mothers as caregivers. While the evidence Chadwick
presented certainly indicated unlawful stereotyping, it was not the type
of overwhelming direct evidence with which courts were faced in Price
Waterhouse or Back. Yet the court was still able to recognize it for what
it was: acting on impermissibly gender-based assumptions. Moreover,
Chadwick succeeded despite a factual scenario that might have been fatal
to earlier claims: The person who was promoted instead of Chadwick was
not only a woman but a mother of two children, aged nine and
238
fourteen. WellPoint made much of this fact; the court, however, did

231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

561 F.3d 38, 42–49 (1st Cir. 2009).
Id. at 41.
Id. at 42.
Id.
Id. (alterations in original).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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not, noting that “[t]he principal focus of [Title VII] is the protection of
the individual employee, rather than the protection of the minority group
239
as a whole,” so “discrimination against one employee cannot be
remedied solely by nondiscrimination against another employee in that
240
same group.” It was not clear that the decisionmakers knew the woman
they selected for promotion was a mother; regardless, the First Circuit
held that “the stereotype that Chadwick complains of would arguably be
more strongly held as to a mother of four children, three of whom were
241
only six years old, than as to a mother of two older children.” Citing
Price Waterhouse and Hibbs, the court explained clearly how those
earlier precedents prohibit gender stereotyping of mothers today:
In the simplest terms, these cases stand for the proposition that
unlawful sex discrimination occurs when an employer takes an adverse
job action on the assumption that a woman, because she is a woman,
will neglect her job responsibilities in favor of her presumed childcare
responsibilities. . . . [A]n employer is not free to assume that a woman,
because she is a woman, will necessarily be a poor worker because of
family responsibilities. The essence of Title VII in this context is that
women have the right to prove their mettle in the work arena without
the burden of stereotypes regarding whether they can fulfill their
242
responsibilities.

Thus, “[g]iven what we know about societal stereotypes regarding
working women with children,” the court held that “a jury could
reasonably determine that a sex-based stereotype was behind [the
243
decisionmaker’s] explanation to Chadwick,” despite the fact that
another woman with children got the promotion.
B. Stereotyping Fathers as “Feminine” Men
Beyond helping to develop a more sophisticated understanding of
how gender stereotypes operate for working mothers, the field of
caregiver discrimination also encompasses penalties against men who
take on a more than nominal role in caring for their children or other
family members. As discussed in Part III, the majority of caregiver
discrimination claims brought by men are brought as violations of the
FMLA. Yet the EEOC guidance on caregiver discrimination includes a
discussion of Title VII protections for male caregivers who experience
gender stereotyping. In addition, a recent and expanding field of social
scientific studies documents that when men are penalized at work for

239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

Id. at 42–43 n.4 (quoting Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 453–54 (1982)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 44–45.
Id. at 46–47.
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taking on caregiving responsibilities, they are actually being penalized for
violating gender norms of masculinity.
1.

EEOC Guidance Extends Caregiver Stereotyping Theory to Men

In its 2007 enforcement guidance on caregiver discrimination, the
EEOC explicitly identified how Title VII offers protections for men who
244
experience sex discrimination based on their caregiving responsibilities.
The guidance, which covers disparate treatment theories under Title VII
and the Americans with Disabilities Act (the EEOC does not enforce the
245
FMLA), includes a specific section entitled “Discrimination Against
246
Male Caregivers.” Citing the Supreme Court in Hibbs, the EEOC
notes:
The Supreme Court has observed that gender-based stereotypes also
influence how male workers are perceived . . . . Stereotypes of men as
“bread winners” can further lead to the perception that a man who
works part time is not a good father [breadwinner], even if he does so
to care for his children. Thus, while working women have generally
borne the brunt of gender-based stereotyping, unlawful assumptions
about working fathers and other male caregivers have sometimes led
employers to deny male employees opportunities that have been
provided to working women or to subject men who are primary
247
caregivers to harassment or other disparate treatment.

The EEOC then provides specific examples of disparate treatment
under Title VII, for example when women, but not men, are granted
reduced or part-time schedules for child care reasons, or when women are
treated more favorably in terms of family leave (unrelated to pregnancy248
disability leave) than men. The inclusion of language on stereotypes
indicates that, where gender stereotyping of men in the work-family
context itself amounts to harassment or is the basis of an adverse action,
it may be actionable as sex discrimination under Title VII.
2.

Social Scientific Studies Document Male Caregivers Being
Penalized for Gender Nonconformity

Underscoring current case law and the EEOC guidance, social
scientific studies over the past two decades have documented that when
men are penalized at work for taking an active role in family caregiving,
they are being penalized for failing to conform to the gender stereotype
that men should be breadwinners and not caregivers. Early studies

244. See EEOC, supra note 225, at 24–25.
245. Id. at 1.
246. Id. at 24–25.
247. Id. at 24 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs,
538 U.S. 721, 736 (2003)).
248. Id. at 25.
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documented that men who worked part-time or took advantage of family
and medical leaves experienced steep penalties at work that were related
249
to gender stereotypes. Men who worked part-time were seen as unable
to fulfill their traditional obligation of full-time employment and thus
lower in “agency” (an attribute associated with masculinity) than were
250
other men as a consequence of their loss of this positive role. Fathers
who took a parental leave of absence, even a short one, were viewed as
less committed and were recommended for fewer rewards than were
women who did so, and received lower ratings on work performance
251
than similarly situated women.
Recent studies in an emerging field of inquiry known as the
“flexibility stigma” (which links the penalties experienced by workers
who adopt flexible or reduced work schedules to maternal wall bias) not
only confirm these findings, but also show that penalties can be triggered
for caregiving men even when they do not take an actual leave from
252
work. In one study, men who requested a twelve-week family leave to
care for a sick child or parent experienced what the researchers
described as a “femininity stigma, whereby ‘acting like a woman’
deprives them of masculine agency (e.g., competence and assertiveness)
and impugns them with negative feminine qualities (e.g., weakness and
253
uncertainty).” As a result, they were “more likely to be viewed as poor
workers and subject to penalties,” (demotion, reduced pay or
responsibilities, termination, or layoff) and “less likely to be
recommended for rewards” (promotion, raises, training, or choice
254
projects). In another study, workers who requested a reduced schedule

249. See, e.g., Tammy D. Allen & Joyce E.A. Russell, Parental Leave of Absence: Some Not So
Family-Friendly Implications, 29 J. Applied Soc. Psychol. 166 (1999); Adam B. Butler & Amie
Skattebo, What Is Acceptable for Women May Not Be for Men: The Effect of Family Conflicts with
Work on Job Performance Ratings, 77 J. Occup. & Org. Psychol. 553 (2004); Alice H. Eagly & Valerie
J. Steffen, Gender Stereotypes, Occupational Roles, and Beliefs About Part-Time Employees,
10 Psychol. Women Q. 252 (1986); Julie Holliday Wayne & Bryanne L. Cordeiro, Who Is a Good
Organizational Citizen?: Social Perception of Male and Female Employees Who Use Family Leave,
49 Sex Roles 233, 233–34 (2003); see also Martin H. Malin, Fathers and Parental Leave Revisited, 19 N.
Ill. U. L. Rev. 25, 39 (1998).
250. See Eagly & Steffen, supra note 249, at 254.
251. See Allen & Russell, supra note 249, at 166; Butler & Skattebo, supra note 249, at 553–59;
Wayne & Cordeiro, supra note 249, at 233–34.
252. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Berdahl & Sun H. Moon, Workplace Mistreatment of Middle Class
Workers Based on Sex, Parenthood, and Caregiving (Working Paper, 2012) (on file with Author);
Laurie A. Rudman & Kris Mescher, Penalizing Men Who Request a Family Leave: Is Flexibility Stigma
a Femininity Stigma? (Working Paper, 2012) (on file with Author); Joseph A. Vandello, et al., When
Equal Isn’t Really Equal: The Masculine Dilemma of Seeking Work Flexibility (Working Paper, 2012)
(on file with Author). The Journal of Social Issues has accepted a formal proposal to publish these and
related articles in a forthcoming special issue on the flexibility stigma.
253. Rudman & Mescher, supra note 252, at 3, 6–7.
254. Id. at 12–14.
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after the birth of a new child “were seen as less masculine and more
feminine than people who worked traditional hours” and were rated
lower on positive job characteristics than full-time workers; but a man
who did so “in effect suffered more by it, because the woman is seen as
conforming to feminine prescriptions whereas a man is seen as a gender
255
In a third study, researchers documented that when
deviant.”
compared to all men and traditional fathers, “fathers who engaged in a
high amount of childcare experienced significantly more masculinity
harassment” (derided for not being “tough enough” or for being “softspoken or shy,” or pressured to “sacrifice family or personal time” to
gain respect at work) and more general workplace mistreatment
256
(excluded, ignored, insulted, bullied, or humiliated). Thus, a growing
body of social science evidence indicates that, for men, demonstrating a
high level of participation in family care triggers penalties for gender
nonconformity: A man who does so is behaving like a mother and is
therefore inconsistent with gender stereotypes of men as breadwinners,
not caregivers.
C. Achieving Ginsburg’s Vision: Workplace Penalties for
Caregiving Men as Title VII Gender Stereotyping for Failing to
Conform to a Masculine Norm
Putting these four jurisprudential pieces together—sex
discrimination as the operation of gender stereotypes under equal
protection (as in Wiesenfeld), Title VII (as in Price Waterhouse), the
FMLA (as in Hibbs), and caregiver discrimination (as in Back)—does
not create a new legal claim. Indeed, since Price Waterhouse, Doe v.
Belleville, and Oncale, men have been able to allege sex discrimination
under a gender stereotyping theory for failing to conform to masculine
norms, and since long before Ginsburg litigated Wiesenfeld, acting like a
caregiver rather than an unencumbered breadwinner has been a
violation of masculine norms. Yet it is useful to draw the path through
these lines of precedent to illustrate what plaintiffs and courts are still
missing. Despite data and human experience that tell us that many men
perceive active family caregiving to be “career suicide,” men are not
alleging this legal theory as robustly as they could and, relatedly, courts
are not recognizing it as much as they should. A few cases in which male
plaintiffs have attempted to allege sex discrimination under a gender
stereotyping theory in the work-family context prove illustrative.
The most successful attempt at this theory in recent years was made
in Knussman v. Maryland, an early caregiver discrimination case brought

255. Vandello, et al., supra note 252, at 18–19.
256. Berdahl & Moon, supra note 252, at 16–17, 23–24.
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as sex discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause because the
257
plaintiff was a public employee seeking access to a benefit. Maryland
state trooper Kevin Knussman’s wife Kimberly became pregnant and
258
developed complications that required bed rest. When Knussman
requested four to eight weeks of “paid ‘family sick leave’ to care for his
wife and spend time with his family following the birth of his child,” his
supervisor told him “that there was ‘no way’ that he would be allowed
more than two weeks,” (his department was understaffed) and,
incorrectly, that any more leave than that would have to be unpaid under
259
the FMLA. Shortly before the birth of his daughter, his employer
announced a new “nurturing leave” law applying to state employees that
allowed primary caregivers—those “primarily responsible for the care
and nurturing of a child”—to use up to thirty days of accrued sick leave to
care for a newborn child and secondary caregivers—those “secondarily
260
responsible for the care and nurturing of a child”—to use up to ten days.
When Knussman inquired about his ability to take leave under the new
law, the female personnel manager told him that “only birth mothers
could qualify as primary care givers; fathers would only be permitted to
take leave as secondary care givers since they ‘couldn’t breast feed a
261
baby.’” After his daughter was born, his wife experienced continued
health problems, so Knussman again tried to extend his leave, this time
explaining that, given his wife’s health problems, “he was the primary
care giver for the child” because “he was performing the majority of the
essential functions such as diaper changing, feeding, bathing and taking
262
the child to the doctor.” The personnel manager again denied his
continued requests, explaining that “God made women to have babies
263
and, unless [he] could have a baby,” there was no way he could qualify.
“[H]is wife had to be ‘in a coma or dead’ . . . for Knussman to qualify as
264
the primary care giver.”
Citing, among other cases, Reed, Frontiero, Califano, and
Wiesenfeld, the Fourth Circuit agreed that Knussman’s state employer
violated equal protection when it applied the nurturing leave policy
265
“unequally solely on the basis of a gender stereotype.” The court
compared the case to those striking down classifications based on

257. 272 F.3d 625 (4th Cir. 2001). The initial case also included violations of the FMLA, but those
were vacated at the district court level. Id. at 632.
258. Id. at 628.
259. Id.
260. Id. (quoting Md. Code Ann. State Pers. & Pens. § 7-508(a)(1)–(b)(1) (1994)).
261. Id. at 629.
262. Id.
263. Id. (alterations in original).
264. Id. at 630.
265. Id. at 634–36.
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“conventional notions about the proper station in society for males and
females” and “generalizations about typical gender roles in the raising
266
and nurturing of children.” The stereotyping in this case was extreme,
and Knussman was able to bring his claim directly following the equal
protection precedent established by Ginsburg’s early cases. Yet as a
recent reminder of how entrenched gender stereotypes impact men and
women at work differently, Knussman stands for the proposition that
stereotyping men out of caregiving roles constitutes sex discrimination.
Indeed, Knussman was cited by the Eleventh Circuit in the recent Title
VII case of Glenn v. Brumby when noting that “discrimination on the
basis of gender stereotype” may include a man “taking too active a role
267
in child-rearing.”
Beyond Knussman, other men who have alleged sex discrimination
under a gender stereotyping theory based on family caregiving have had
less success, often due to a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law
or to some lack of proof or fact. For example, in Hayden v. Garden Ridge
Management, LLC, the district court held against the plaintiff on his Title
VII sex discrimination claim based on an incorrect application of the law
regarding what a plaintiff is required to show to make out a prima facie
268
case of sex discrimination under Title VII. Tom Hayden was working
as a store general manager when he requested FMLA leave to care for
his wife and newborn child for three intermittent periods totaling the
269
twelve weeks to which he was entitled by law. In response to his
request, the company’s human resources representative, a woman,
“questioned the amount of time he requested off and stated ‘[i]t’s very
strange that we have a male manager request that amount of time off, we
270
have never had that before.’” His request was granted—but then he
271
was fired a week later. When he sued alleging violations of the FMLA
and for sex discrimination under Title VII, his claim for FMLA
retaliation was upheld against his employer’s motion for summary
272
In a cursory
judgment; his Title VII claim, however, was not.
discussion, the magistrate judge who wrote the opinion required that, “to
establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination,” Hayden had to
273
show that “he was replaced by a person not in the protected group.”
The court reasoned that because the plaintiff was “replaced by another
266. Id. at 636.
267. 663 F.3d 1312, 1318–19 n.8 (1ith Cir. 2011).
268. No. 4:08cv172, 2009 WL 5196718, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 22, 2009).
269. Id. at *1.
270. Id. at *4 (alteration in original).
271. Id. at *1.
272. Id. at *5.
273. Id. (citing St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509 (1993); Alvarado v. Tex. Rangers,
492 F.3d 605, 611 (5th Cir. 2007)).
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male . . . he cannot show he was replaced by someone outside his
274
protected class, and his gender discrimination claim therefore fails.”
Yet this is a basic misreading of federal employment discrimination law
that has been rejected by the Supreme Court in the context of age
discrimination, and by most circuit courts in the context of sex and race
discrimination: A plaintiff’s claim of discrimination is not barred simply
275
because he was replaced by a member of the same protected class.
Unfortunately, due to the court’s misapplication of Title VII sex
discrimination to a male plaintiff, Hayden was denied the chance to
276
prove his sex discrimination claim under a gender stereotyping theory.
Other cases show how men alleging sex discrimination for
caregiving issues may be particularly disadvantaged by courts that
misapply the comparator “requirement” under Title VII due to the
widespread mistreatment of working women based on their caregiving
responsibilities. To make out a prima facie case of sex discrimination
under Title VII, a plaintiff must allege, among other things, that the
adverse employment action he experienced arose “under circumstances
277
which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.” As
278
the most common (and traditionally most
described previously,
279
convincing ) way for a plaintiff to prove this is by pointing to a
comparator—a similarly qualified coworker from outside the protected
280
class who was treated better. Yet this is not required by Title VII.
Despite this fact, some courts still require a plaintiff to provide such
281
comparator evidence to make out a prima facie case under Title VII,
which may pose particular hurdles for caregiving men.

274. Id.
275. See Dianne Avery et al., Employment Discrimination Law: Cases and Materials on
Equality in the Workplace 110–11 (8th ed. 2010) (citing O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers
Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 312 (1996), and its progeny) (“[T]he fact that one person in the protected class has
lost out to another person in the protected class is . . . irrelevant, so long as he has lost because of [a
protected classification].”).
276. The case, however, settled. See Verdict, Agreement and Settlement, Hayden v. Garden Ridge
Mgmt., LLC, No. 4:08CV172, 2010 WL 1483289 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 26, 2010).
277. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
278. For a discussion of this issue in the context of the Back decision, see supra notes 205–22 and
accompanying text.
279. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (describing, in a race discrimination
case, that evidence of white employees with “comparable” backgrounds who were treated better than
the black plaintiff would be “especially relevant” to a showing that the employer was motivated by
unlawful discrimination).
280. See Avery et al., supra note 275, at 111–13; see also Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by
Comparison, 120 Yale L.J. 728, 731–32 n.3 (2011); Ernest F. Lidge III, The Courts’ Misuse of the
Similarly Situated Concept in Employment Discrimination Law, 67 Mo. L. Rev. 831, 839 (2002);
Charles A. Sullivan, The Phoenix from the Ash: Proving Discrimination by Comparators, 60 Ala. L.
Rev. 191, 204–06 (2009).
281. See Avery et al., supra note 275, at 111–13 (discussing how some circuit courts of appeals
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For example, in McGarity v. Mary Kay Cosmetics, the district court
granted summary judgment against plaintiff Gregory McGarity’s Title
VII sex discrimination claim (and his FMLA claims) when he failed to
282
prove that a similarly situated woman was treated better than he. When
McGarity, a cosmetics technician, told his supervisor he planned to take
FMLA leave when his wife gave birth to their third child, his supervisor
“reacted badly” and “complained to others in their department that men
could not or should not be allowed to take leave for the birth of a
283
child.” Nevertheless, McGarity was granted three weeks of leave, after
which he claimed that his supervisor reacted with hostility, subjecting
McGarity to unwarranted “accusations” of “errors,” “inaccurate
complaints” about his work efforts, and “miscalculations of McGarity’s
284
efficiency ratings” based on which his performance was judged. As a
result, McGarity was suspended; he complained to human resources but,
believing his complaint was not taken seriously, ultimately left to take
285
another job. Based on the employer’s evidence that “women in the
company [who] had taken FMLA leave . . . had not been treated any
differently on return” and that men “who had not taken FMLA leave
[but made workplace mistakes] received the same disciplinary sanctions
as McGarity in similar situations,” the district court held that McGarity
286
had not made out a prima facie case of sex discrimination. Indeed, this
particular case may have lacked a strong enough factual basis to prove
287
sex discrimination based on a gender stereotyping theory. Regardless,
the district court undermined a potentially legitimate sex discrimination
claim through a mistaken framing of the requirements for making out a
prima facie case. McGarity lost at summary judgment because the court
compared his treatment to that of women who signaled their role as
caregivers by taking a family leave, and to gender conforming men with
poor workplace performance. Neither comparison rebuts the claim that,
consistent with a gender stereotyping theory under Title VII, a man who
participates in family caregiving and, therefore, fails to conform to the
masculine breadwinner stereotype may be penalized at work for doing so
288
when he is subsequently subjected to greater scrutiny and discipline.

require comparator evidence, while others view it as only one means for proving an inference of
discrimination).
282. No. 3:96-cv-3413-R, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1150, at *13–14 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 20, 1998).
283. Id. at *2.
284. Id. at *3.
285. Id. at *3–4.
286. Id. at *13–14.
287. Id. at *15–16 (discussing how McGarity’s case, even had it made it passed the prima facie
stage, might have failed at the pretext stage based on his admission that he did, in fact, make the
mistake that led to his suspension).
288. For other examples of courts misapplying the comparator requirement to Title VII claims
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Still other cases show courts dismissing evidence of gender
stereotyping of men in the work-family context as either insignificant or
as based not on sex but on status as a parent (which is not protected
under federal law), thus missing the point that penalizing men for failure
to conform to a masculine gender stereotype can rise to the level of sex
discrimination. In Cumbie v. General Shale Brick, the district court
granted summary judgment against a plaintiff after finding that the
family-care-related sexual harassment and retaliation he experienced did
289
not amount to sex discrimination. Dana Cumbie, a fifty-five-year-old
male truck driver for a brick company who lived with and cared for his
eighty-seven-year-old mother, was met with a number of harassing
drawings of him posted and spread around his workplace several times
290
over the course of a month. One drawing depicted him riding a
motorcycle with his mother; another pictured him in a boat with two men
and a drum of Preparation H floating nearby, with the caption “butt
hurts”; a third showed him on a couch next to a penis pump and, at the
announcement of the band the Dixie Chicks on television, saying,
291
“What? Chicks with Dix?” Cumbie complained to his employer, who
agreed it was offensive; yet over the next two months, despite having
received excellent performance ratings and three merit awards in the
prior year, Cumbie was given less work, required to take an alcohol test,
and suspended twice for failing to report workers’ compensation claims
292
“in a timely manner.”
Then, while on an FMLA leave to care for his mother, Cumbie was
293
terminated before his leave expired. While finding that the drawings
derided Cumbie for being a “Momma’s Boy” and “inappropriately
ridicule[d] [him] as gay, . . . impotent and somehow interested in
transsexuals,” the district court found that the harassment was merely
“boorish and juvenile” and “insufficient to . . . lead[] a person to
reasonably believe” that he had experienced hostile work environment
294
sexual harassment that amounted to sex discrimination. Further,
because the underlying sex discrimination claim was unreasonable, the

brought by men in the context of family caregiving, see, for example, Palomares v. Second Federal
Savings & Loan Ass’n of Chicago, No. 10-cv-6124, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19143 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 25,
2011); Samuels v. Baltimore, No. RDB 09-458, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96228 (D. Md. Oct. 15, 2009);
Beyst v. Pinnacle Airlines, Inc., No. 07-10927, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45468 (E.D. Mich. June 11, 2008)
(making a similar claim under state law).
289. 508 F. Supp. 2d 486 (E.D. Va. 2007), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 302 F. App’x
192 (4th Cir. 2008).
290. Id. at 488.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 488–89.
293. Id. at 489.
294. Id. at 491.
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district court held that the retaliation that occurred after Cumbie
295
complained was not actionable. The appellate court remanded the
296
retaliation claim.
Similarly, in Marchioli v. Garland Co., the district court ruled that
an employer’s threat to heavily scrutinize an employee who was about to
become a father, although “clearly reprehensible,” was not enough to
297
amount to sex discrimination and dismissed plaintiff’s Title VII claim.
Plaintiff Anthony Marchioli was performing his job as a sales
representative well, receiving “very positive evaluations,” when his
298
girlfriend became pregnant. He requested one afternoon off to assist
299
her with finding a doctor. Immediately, his supervisor began criticizing
his work and gave him a negative evaluation, despite the fact that
Marchioli had reached one hundred percent of his sales quota after three
300
months of work. In a written evaluation, his supervisor warned him
about “distractions,” given his girlfriend’s pregnancy, and expressed his
clear view that active participation in family caregiving was inconsistent
with being a good salesman:
You need to decide if you want to totally commit yourself to this
endeavor. If you don’t want to “buy in” and put a maximum effort into
developing your career, do me . . . a favor and quit now. . . . I’m not
going to tolerate working with a guy who does not give it his
all. . . . You need to decide what you want to do. I intend to monitor
very closely your progress from here on out. If you do not want to
301
work under that kind of scrutiny, leave now.
302

The next month, Marchioli was fired.
The district court, while granting the employer’s motion to dismiss
Marchioli’s complaint for sex discrimination under Title VII, held that
Marchioli “was terminated because of his gender-neutral classification as
303
a parent or parent-to-be.” Yet in doing so, the district court overlooked
that terminating a male employee after he signaled gender
nonconformity (that he planned to take an active role in caregiving by
requesting an afternoon off to find a doctor), overtly stating that it was
not possible to be both a good worker and an active caregiver, and

295. Id. at 491–92.
296. Cumbie v. Gen. Shale Brick, 302 F. App’x 192, 194 (2008).
297. No. 5:11-CV-124, 2011 WL 1983350, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. May 20, 2011).
298. Id. at *1.
299. Id.
300. Id. at *1–2.
301. Id. at *1.
302. Id. at *2.
303. Id. at *5. The court also dismissed Marchioli’s claims for pregnancy discrimination under the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act (because only pregnant women are covered by the Act) and for
associational discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act (because his girlfriend’s normal
pregnancy did not meet the definition of “disabled” under the Act). Id. at *5, *8.
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threatening to hyperscrutinize “a guy who does not give it his all” could
amount to actionable gender stereotyping of a male employee. Indeed,
while it is not clear that Marchioli ultimately could have proven gender
discrimination under Title VII, the district court did not give him a
304
chance, dismissing his case before it even began.
As these cases and others like them demonstrate, many courts—and
even plaintiffs’ attorneys—have yet to understand how Title VII gender
stereotyping theory applies to prevent sex discrimination against
caregiving men. Rooting out employment decisions based on
stereotypical notions of the roles men and women should properly play
at work and at home is at the very core of how the Supreme Court has
always defined sex discrimination. While the courts have yet to decide a
Price Waterhouse-style discrimination case on behalf of a man penalized
at work for failing to conform to the masculine stereotype of the
unencumbered breadwinner, such a decision may only be a matter of
time. One case pending in federal district court in Massachusetts, Ayanna
v. Dechert, LLP, provides an example of how to effectively plead such a
305
claim. In the lawsuit, plaintiff Ariel Ayanna, a male attorney and father
of two, alleged sex discrimination under Title VII and the state law
306
equivalent based on a gender stereotyping theory. Ayanna was a wellperforming attorney who had received a bonus; then his wife became
pregnant with their second child and experienced serious mental health
307
problems. Ayanna took leave to care for his children and wife; when he
returned, the firm discriminated and retaliated against him, limiting his
308
assignments and opportunities and ultimately terminating him. As the
complaint alleges:
Ayanna was an equal co-parent of his children . . . . After [his wife
suffered serious health issues], he became the primary caretaker of
their children and had to care for her, assuming a traditionally
“female” role.
. . . Dechert’s firm culture equates masculinity with relegating
caretaking to women and working long hours in the office. . . . Ayanna
did not conform to Dechert’s firm culture for males.
. . . Ayanna contends that Dechert terminated him because [among
other things] he refused to assume a stereotypically “male” role in
309
connection with his children . . . .

304. Id. at *8. As of May 20, 2011, the complaint has been dismissed and the case closed.
305. Complaint and Jury Demand, Ayanna v. Dechert, LLP, No. 110CV12155, 2010 WL 5344371
(D. Mass. Dec. 14, 2010).
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id.
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The complaint also states that, because he was a man, “Ayanna was
treated differently from female caregivers,” who generally “were allowed
and expected to leave or rearrange their schedules to attend to [family]
obligations, to work from home, and to return to work later in the
310
This, the complaint alleges, “demonstrat[es] that [his
evening.”
employer] intends that only women were to fulfill this role and
discriminates against men who take a traditionally ‘female’ caretaking
311
role.” As such, in addition to claims under the Americans with
Disabilities Act and the FMLA, the complaint includes counts for “sex
discrimination based upon disparate treatment and unlawful
312
stereotyping” in violation of Title VII and the equivalent state law.
While the case may be the first to plead the issue so clearly, the
precedent established from the early equal protection cases through
Price Waterhouse, and from Oncale through Hibbs, supports the idea that
penalizing men at work for failing to conform to masculine stereotypes of
breadwinners, free from the demands of—or desire for—family
caregiving, may be actionable sex discrimination.

Conclusion
Forty years ago, Ruth Bader Ginsburg understood that the ideology
of separate spheres was as limiting to men as it was to women and,
through her litigation strategy, led the Supreme Court to define sex
discrimination in a way that encompassed this understanding. In the
intervening decades, the law has evolved to recognize that stereotyping
women out of the market sphere and into the domestic sphere is
actionable sex discrimination. Precedent has also established that
penalizing both women and men at work for failing to conform to
313
“impermissibly cabined view[s] of the proper behavior” for each is
actionable sex discrimination under a gender stereotyping theory. Yet
gender-based stereotypes around expected roles in the work and family
context remain strongly entrenched in American society. While male
caregivers often prevail in lawsuits alleging that they were penalized at
work for using family leave or benefits to which they were entitled (for
example, under the FMLA or an employer policy), they have yet to use
Title VII gender stereotyping theory in a robust fashion to remedy this
problem.

310. Id. ¶ 28.
311. Id.
312. Id. The plaintiff later voluntarily dismissed his federal Title VII and Americans with
Disabilities Act claims but maintained his state law claims. Ayanna v. Dechert LLP, No. 10-12155NMG, 2012 WL 39580, at *1 (D. Mass. Jan. 6, 2012).
313. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 236–37 (1989).
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By the letter of the law, this Article argues, men currently have a
cause of action for such gender stereotyping under Title VII. Yet federal
courts’ understanding of how to apply Title VII in lawsuits by men
alleging stereotyping based on their participation in family care—and
some plaintiffs attorneys’ understanding of how to effectively plead such
a case—has limited the effectiveness of this remedy. Courts are poised to
take the final step in ridding the workplace of separate spheres ideology:
recognizing that stereotyping men out of the domestic sphere and into
the market sphere is actionable sex discrimination based on unlawful
gender stereotypes. This step is needed for antidiscrimination law to
achieve its full promise of allowing individuals access to gender equality,
free from the sex-based stereotypes that constrain them, whether they
are men or women—a promise Ginsburg envisioned four decades ago.

